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Big Tech’s Buying Spree and the Failed Ideology 
of Competition Law 
MARK GLICK,† CATHERINE RUETSCHLIN,† & DARREN BUSH† 
Big Tech is on a buying spree. Companies like Apple, Google, Facebook, and Amazon are 
gobbling up smaller companies at an unprecedented pace. But the law of competition isn’t ready 
for Big Tech’s endless appetite. Today’s antitrust law is controlled by the Chicago School of Law 
and Economics. The Chicago School’s ideological frame is toothless when a dominant firm 
purchases a startup that could be a future competitor. Under the “potential competition” 
doctrine, the Chicago School is impotent to face the anti-competitive thread of Big Tech.  
This Article shows how the Chicago School of law and economics hobbles antitrust law and policy 
on potential competition mergers. It illustrates this problem with a close study of public 
information regarding Facebook. The Article assembles a database of Facebook’s completed 
acquisitions—ninety in all—and shows how the “potential competition” doctrine renders 
competition law entirely impotent to protect the consumer interest in this space. What is true for 
Facebook applies to the market generally. While we offer no opinion on any particular merger, 
protecting the consumer against the ravenous appetite of Big Tech requires rejecting the potential 
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INTRODUCTION 
Big Tech dominates the technology sector in the American economy. Five 
technology firms—Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft—claim 
the top five spots on the NASDAQ by market capitalization.1 And Big Tech is 
hungry for more. All five companies are buying smaller companies at an 
unprecedented pace. Google has acquired 270 companies since 2001, including 
Android, YouTube, and Waze.2 Microsoft has made over 100 acquisitions in the 
last ten years, including acquisitions of Skype, Nokia Devices, LinkedIn and 
GitHub.3 Amazon has made a similar number of acquisitions, including its 
purchase of Whole Foods.4 Facebook has acquired ninety companies, mainly 
startups.5  
A growing chorus of commentators have argued that Big Tech’s appetite 
for expanding through purchasing other companies provide a potential means 
for these dominant firms to solidify and protect their dominance.6 While we do 
not determine whether any particular merger was anticompetitive, this Article, 
relying exclusively on public information, joins that chorus but adds a new twist. 
It argues that existing law of mergers is ill-equipped to address the tech firms’ 
acquisition of startups because of a rule called the “potential competition” 
doctrine. The potential competition doctrine addresses the effects of an 
acquisition where one firm is in the market and the other is “waiting in the 
wings” or on the periphery of the market.  
The problem with the potential competition doctrine, we argue, is its 
extraordinarily high burden of proof. That burden can be traced back to Justice 
Powell’s opinion in United States v. Marine Bancorporation.7 The Marine 
Bancorporation case imposed an extravagant evidentiary burden for a violation 
of § 7 of the Clayton Act based on elimination of potential competition.8 
Decades later, that standard has gutted the proper role of competition law and 
rendered it effectively inapplicable to today’s mergers in digital markets. A 
dramatic rethinking of the doctrine is needed to enable federal antitrust 
enforcement agencies to protect consumers. 
In this Article, we explore how the proper use of potential competition 
doctrine might have halted the transactions that have led to massive Big Tech. 
We begin by examining the history of Facebook’s acquisition strategy and how 
 
 1. Stock Screener, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx? 
exchange=NASDAQ&sortname=marketcap&sorttype=1 (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 2. Tim Wu & Stuart A. Thompson, The Roots of Big Tech Run Disturbingly Deep, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/07/opinion/google-facebook-mergers-acquisitions-
antitrust.html. 
 3. Calls to Rein in the Tech Titans Are Getting Louder, ECONOMIST (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/07/16/calls-to-rein-in-the-tech-titans-are-getting-louder. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See infra Appendix (listing Facebook’s acquisitions by year). 
 6. See Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 792–97 (2017); Wu & Thompson, 
supra note 2; Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019),  
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c/. 
 7. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 604 (1974). 
 8. Id. at 623–26. 
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it could have contributed to Facebook’s rise to dominance and the maintenance 
of its dominance. 
Facebook and other Big Tech companies maintain their market dominance 
by harnessing the network effects that reinforce user value in the consumer-
facing market and advertiser benefits in digital advertising markets. Startup 
firms provide competitive pressure because they are able to siphon off or “cream 
skim” customers and collect valuable data. Big Tech acquisition of startup 
companies may benefit the incumbent by reducing competitive pressure of 
potential entrants on the periphery of the market or by preventing future entry 
and expansion by such firms that could undermine the incumbent’s dominance.  
Such acquisitions are typically analyzed under the potential competition 
doctrine. In the next Part, we discuss how the Court transformed a once workable 
standard into a completely unworkable, open-ended prediction of future conduct 
and performance that could not be practically discharged. We discuss how the 
Court split the doctrine in two, creating the actual potential competition doctrine 
and the perceived potential competition doctrine, each with different evidentiary 
requirements. It ultimately expressed disdain over one of the doctrines it created, 
suggesting that no plaintiff could meet such a standard. 
We then discuss, using public information, the competition harm story of 
Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp. In each Part, we detail 
why antitrust enforcement agencies failed to challenge mergers. We then 
describe why the potential competition doctrine as currently applied would lead 
to a false negative; namely, an acquisition that is competitively harmful yet not 
challenged by federal antitrust enforcement agencies. The high initial burden on 
the plaintiff to present a case concerning future conduct and competitive effects 
serves as a serious deterrent to potential competition mergers, even by dominant 
firms.  
In the next Part, we seek to alter the potential competition doctrine. Using 
the 1968 Merger Guidelines and additions from the potential competition 
literature, we assert that with simple structural presumption, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) could have elected to challenge these mergers and shifted 
the burden to Facebook to demonstrate why no harm to future competition could 
occur, and why, given Facebook’s resources it could not internally innovate to 
achieve its competitive goals.  
I.  FACEBOOK’S HISTORY OF ACQUISITIONS OF SMALL POTENTIAL 
COMPETITORS 
Big Tech firms operate in online platform markets where they provide 
critical facilitation services between buyers and sellers, users and content 
providers, and advertisers and consumers.9 Their services include search 
 
 9. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) identifies platforms as the 
main intermediary between consumers and other digital market participants and distinguishes between attention 
platforms and matching platforms. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Big 
Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era, at 12, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP(2016)14 (Oct. 27, 2016), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2016)14/en/pdf. The European Commission offers a definition of 
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engines, social networks, ecommerce, digital advertising, app stores, and 
operating systems, where platforms connect parties online to facilitate 
transactions. The increased functionality and speed of the internet has made 
platforms exceptionally efficient in connecting end users. The tremendous 
profits earned by these firms create strong incentives for others to enter these 
markets, yet two or fewer Big Tech firms have dominated many of these markets 
for years.10 Some observers contend that the Big Tech large-scale acquisition 
programs have diluted the natural process of competitive entry, with firms 
entering the market with the sole intent of being acquired, as there would be no 
other plausible endgame.11 
Online platforms typically operate in two-sided markets including a 
consumer-facing market for digital services and a market for online 
advertising.12 In order for a platform to maintain its position in both the digital 
services and the online advertising markets, it must maintain the most desirable 
platform for users and prevent users from switching to other platforms. In other 
words, user traffic is important to both markets because they each exhibit strong 
network effects.13 In social networking, for example, users value the social 
network with the most opportunities to reach others; advertisers benefit from 
 
online platforms composed of several features: platforms “share key characteristics including the use of 
information and communication technologies to facilitate interactions (including commercial transactions) 
between users, collection and use of data about these interactions, and network effects which make the use of 
the platforms with most users most valuable to other users.” JASON FURMAN, DIANE COYLE, AMELIA FLETCHER, 
DEREK MCAULEY & PHILIP MARSDEN, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION: REPORT OF THE DIGITAL 
COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL 21–22 (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf (quoting 
Online Platforms, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/online-platforms-digital-single-
market (Jan. 22, 2021)). 
 10. In June 2019, U.S. Assistant Attorney General Delrahim identified the internet search, social networks, 
mobile and desktop operating systems, and electronic book markets as controlled by one or two key firms. Makan 
Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., “ . . . And Justice for All”: Antitrust Enforcement and Digital Gatekeepers (June 
11, 2019), in Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Delivers Remarks for the Antitrust New Frontiers 
Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-
delrahim-delivers-remarks-antitrust-new-frontiers. Fiona Scott Morton et al. identify search engines, social 
networks, network operating systems, ecommerce, and ride-sharing as markets where few firms or one firm hold 
significant market positions. FIONA SCOTT MORTON ET AL., STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF ECON. & THE 
STATE, STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS 34 (2019), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-
/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---committee-report---stigler-center.pdf. 
 11. Wu & Thompson, supra note 2. 
 12. See Timothy J. Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)Application of the Economics of Two-
Sided Markets, 2500 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 515 (2005). The requirements of the market of a two-sided market 
are:  
Three conditions must be present in a two-sided market: (1) two distinct groups of customers; (2) the 
value obtained by one group increases with the size of the other; and (3) an intermediary connects 
the two. Coordination of two-sided markets requires that this intermediary or “middleman” create a 
platform for the groups to interact. The intermediary must ensure the existence of a critical mass on 
both sides. Which side of the market exists first is not crucial; what does matter is that “the product 
may not exist at all if the business does not get the price structure right.” 
Id. at 517–18 (quoting DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL 
REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 4 (2d ed. 2005)). 
 13. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 12, at 133. 
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greater user numbers in terms of reach and consumer targeting.14 Such direct and 
indirect network effects have resulted in Facebook becoming a dominant 
provider. Once a dominant firm establishes itself in an online platform market, 
the network effects and data-driven efficiencies in digital markets tend to 
reinforce dominance even when new rivals improve or produce novel products.15  
While strong network effects can cause markets to tip and create a 
dominant firm, they can also allow small nascent competitors with a desirable 
alternative platform to scale quickly and challenge such dominance. Innovating 
startup firms provide competitive pressure in such markets when they exhibit 
rapid user growth and the potential to enter the dominant firm’s core market. 
Prior to entry into the core market, these nascent firms demonstrate their 
potential by diverting users from the dominant platform or acquiring data that 
would be valuable on the advertising side of the market. This information 
provides a signal to the dominant firms, creating an incentive to absorb or 
eliminate the nascent rival. A nascent competitor can improve the economic 
performance of the market overall by preventing a dominant firm from reducing 
quality, raising prices, or curtailing innovation.16 The nascent startup that 
blossoms into a competitive rival can reinvigorate the competitive process 
within the dominant firm’s core market. In this context, acquisitions of nascent 
competitors by dominant firms undermine both current and future competition, 
reinforcing the incumbent’s dominance in the face of technological shifts.17  
 
 14. These “network effects” predate the internet, with common pre-internet examples being the telephone 
directory and shopping malls. See Muris, supra note 12, at 518 n.4. 
 15. This relationship is characterized by the OECD as a feedback loop in which a company with a large 
user base can collect more data to improve service quality and acquire new users, generating more user data to 
mine for monetization opportunities with the resulting funds channeled toward acquiring new users. In this 
scenario a consumer must choose between a smaller platform with better features but poorer information 
targeting and the dominant firm with less appealing features but the benefit of data richness. OECD, supra note 
9, at 10. 
 16. We assume here that switching costs are low. See JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: 
RESTORING A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 160–61 (2019) (“Future competition may be threatened when a dominant 
information technology platform (or other large firm) acquires a potential rival. When the potential rival would 
be expected to innovate were it to enter, possibly leading the dominant incumbent to upgrade its products or 
services in response, the competitive harms from merger may involve reduced innovation incentives, not just 
lessened future price competition.”). 
 17. In a recent review of the Industrial Organization empirical literature, Steven Berry, Martin Gaynor, and 
Fiona Scott Morton describe potential competition as follows:  
Acquisition of potential competitors when they are still small can be a way for a dominant firm to 
improve quality or to fold a complement into its core product—or just to block a future potential 
entrant. Traditional antitrust enforcement has often focused on whether a merger led to an immediate 
significant increase in market share, not on how it affected potential or nascent competition. But 
when a market is subject to strong network effects, competition is for the market, and the possibility 
that the nascent entrant could contest the incumbent is an important source of competition. Frequently 
mentioned anecdotes include big tech companies’ acquisitions of small firms in adjacent product 
markets, such as Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp. In a study of the 
pharmaceutical industry, Cunningham, Ederer, and Ma (2018) conclude that about 6.4 percent of 
pharma acquisitions are “killer acquisitions,” where the acquisition eliminates entry by a potential 
competitor. However, both the probability and the value of potential entry are uncertain, and research 
on identifying or measuring these effects in different settings would be extremely useful.  
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Facebook’s record demonstrates how acquisitions can play a critical role 
in the rise to dominance and the maintenance of dominance by a Big Tech 
incumbent. At the time of Facebook’s launch in 2004, the social media market 
was highly competitive, with multiple new social networks emerging each 
year.18 Facebook’s famed beginnings in a Harvard dorm room filled a new niche 
in the social networking market. The site opened exclusively to the Harvard 
community—requiring a Harvard.edu email address to join—before extending 
services to Stanford, Columbia, and Yale.19 The interface was simple, providing 
a few core social networking functions, including profile pages where users 
could post a single photo and personalized information, as well as a “friend 
graph” or database of connections between individuals that could be searched 
via user names or other attributes to identify and request new connections.20  
The site was immediately popular and each new user added to its overall 
utility as more friends or potential friends joined the network. Despite its limited 
Ivy League user base, by December 2004 the site had grown to one million 
monthly active members.21 Its popularity drew the attention of funders. Funding 
drove expansion, first to more universities, then high schools, then workplaces, 
and finally in September 2006 to anyone in the world. By the time Facebook 
was opened to all people willing to register, the company had already received 
more than $40 million in angel and venture capital investments.22 This funding 
enabled the company to pursue an ambitious growth strategy, including early 
acquisitions, which made it possible for the company to take advantage of 
economies of scale and scope and network effects in the social networking 
market.23  
Social media use grew rapidly in the years of Facebook’s early expansion. 
According to survey data from the Pew Research Center, just 7% of U.S. adults 
participated in social networking in 2005. Over the following decade, that 
number would rise to 65%, with the fastest growth occurring before 2011.24 
Facebook positioned itself to take advantage of this market growth by expanding 
its user base, articulating a qualitative product differentiation between itself and 
 
Steven Berry, Martin Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical 
Industrial Organization, 33 J. ECON. PERSPS. 44, 61 (2019). 
 18. danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. 
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 212 (2008) (providing a timeline of “Major Social Network Sites” showing 
the launch of six sites in 2003, twelve in 2004, and nine in 2005). 
 19. Id. at 218; Adam P. Schneider, Facebook Expands Beyond Harvard, HARVARD CRIMSON (Mar. 1, 
2004),  https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2004/3/1/facebook-expands-beyond-harvard-harvard-students/.  
 20. Alan J. Tabak, Hundreds Register for New Facebook Website, HARVARD CRIMSON (Feb. 9, 2004), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2004/2/9/hundreds-register-for-new-facebook-website/; Alyson Shontell, 
The Only 8 Features Facebook Had When It Launched in 2004, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2014, 12:49 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebooks-first-8-features-from-2004-2014-8. 
 21. Company Info, FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 22. Facebook Funding Rounds, CRUNCHBASE (May 20, 2019), https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/ 
facebook/funding_rounds/funding_rounds_list#section-funding-rounds. 
 23. Chris Hughes, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebook-zuckerberg.html. 
 24. Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005–2015, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/. 
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its competitors,25 and integrating new ways of engaging users into its suite of 
social networking functions by offering new features and functionalities. 
Facebook operated in a rapidly changing competitive environment where 
the basic technological undergirding of the social network was evolving, 
including the increasing importance of mobile technology to connect users 
online. Beginning in 2007, the company initiated a series of acquisitions of both 
its potential rivals in the social media market and firms in adjacent markets that 
could divert user engagement away from the social network. This tactic arguably 
propelled Facebook’s growth strategy as the company overtook its main 
competitors. Figure 1 shows the number of acquisitions Facebook completed 
each year from 2004 to 2018, as well as the number of monthly active users 
reported by the company each year.26  
 
 
          Partially as a result of Facebook’s acquisition strategy, when market user 
growth leveled off, competitors like MySpace, Windows Live Spaces, and 
 
 25. See Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey Towards 
Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39, 47–49 (2019). 
Srinivasan provides a careful account of competition based on perceived privacy protections as Facebook’s user 
growth accelerated from 2005 to 2014. Id. at 54–55. She argues that the representations and misrepresentations 
of Facebook as a privacy-focused company were strategic decisions to establish trust in the brand and drive user 
growth—a strategy that diminished in importance after Facebook achieved monopoly power in the social media 
market. Id. 
 26. Acquisitions data from Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Data (2019) and Nexis 
Uni Mergers and Acquisitions Data (2019). Number of users reported is monthly active users (MAUs) from 
corporate reports of Q4 results.  Investor Relations, FACEBOOK, https://investor.fb.com/home/default.aspx; 
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Google’s Orkut suffered significantly, while the number of new users active on 
Facebook each year continued to measure in the hundreds of millions.27 
Facebook first surpassed its main rival, MySpace, to become the most popular 
website in the United States in 2009, just five years after its founding.28 By 2011, 
when more than half of all adults and two-thirds of internet users were regular 
users of social networks, Facebook dominated the industry by a wide margin.29 
Pew Research Center data from 2011 showed that while 92% of social network 
users regularly accessed Facebook, just 29% utilized the nearest competitor, 
MySpace, while 18% used LinkedIn and 13% used Twitter.30 
From 2007 to 2018 Facebook acquired or attempted to acquire more than 
100 companies in competing and adjacent markets.31 The ninety acquisitions 
completed since the company’s founding, and documented in the Appendix, 
range from small acquisitions like the $2.5 million purchase of location services 
network Nextstop to the $19 billion acquisition of popular instant messaging 
rival WhatsApp in 2014.32 They include deals that transferred key technology 
and expertise to the company in markets for app development platforms, instant 
messaging, photo sharing, location services, user information and surveillance, 
and advertising and analytics. Many of the acquisitions converted stand-alone 
apps, websites, and platforms that worked inter-operably across competing 
 
 27. Erick Schonfeld, Top Social Media Sites of 2008 (Facebook Still Rising), TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 31, 2008, 
10:47 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2008/12/31/top-social-media-sites-of-2008-facebook-still-rising/; Matthew 
Garrahan, The Rise and Fall of MySpace, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2009, 3:30 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
fd9ffd9c-dee5-11de-adff-00144feab49a; Nicholas Jackson & Alexis C. Madrigal, The Rise and Fall of MySpace, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 12, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the-rise-and-fall-of-
myspace/69444/. 
 28. More Americans Go to Facebook than Myspace, PC MAG (June 16, 2009), https://www.pcmag.com/ 
news/241432/more-americans-go-to-facebook-than-myspace. 
 29. KEITH N. HAMPTON, LAUREN SESSIONS GOULET, LEE RAINIE & KRISTEN PURCELL, PEW RSCH. CTR., 
SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AND OUR LIVES 3, 13 (2011), https://www.pewinternet.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
sites/9/media/Files/Reports/2011/PIP-Social-networking-sites-and-our-lives.pdf. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Acquisitions data from Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Data (2019) and Nexis 
Uni Mergers and Acquisitions Data (2019). Snapchat and Twitter famously rejected acquisition bids from 
Facebook. Evelyn M. Rusli & Douglas MacMillan, Messaging Service Snapchat Spurned $3 Billion Facebook 
Bid, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2013, 9:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230378960457919 
6023009484870; Henry Blodget, Twitter Rejects $500 Million Takeover Offer from Facebook, BUS. INSIDER 
(Nov. 24, 2008, 10:45 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/2008/11/twitter-rejects-500-million-takeover-
offer-from-facebook. Reported attempts by Facebook to purchase Skype and Waze terminated when Microsoft 
purchased Skype for $8.5 billion in 2011 and Google purchased Waze for $966 million in 2013. See Peter Bright, 
Microsoft Buys Skype for $8.5 Billion. Why, Exactly?, WIRED (May 10, 2011, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2011/05/microsoft-buys-skype-2/; Peter Cohan, Google to Spite Facebook, Buy Waze 
for $1.3 Billion, FORBES (June 9, 2013, 2:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2013/06/09/google-
to-spite-facebook-buy-waze-for-1-3-billion/?sh=49d5ab162280; Dara Kerr, Google Reveals It Spent $966 
Million in Waze Acquisition, CNET (July 25, 2013, 8:22 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/google-reveals-it-
spent-966-million-in-waze-acquisition/. 
 32. Facebook to Acquire WhatsApp, FACEBOOK (Feb. 19, 2014), https://about.fb.com/news/2014/02/ 
facebook-to-acquire-whatsapp/. 
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networks into Facebook-exclusive features. Other products were simply 
shuttered in the days or months following their acquisition.33 
Today, Facebook is number three on the list of most-trafficked websites in 
the world.34 With Instagram, Messenger, Facebook, and WhatsApp, the 
company now owns four of the most popular mobile apps in the United States.35 
Facebook is responsible for about ten percent of the mobile browser market, 
representing a substantial share of mobile users for whom Facebook is the main 
point of entry for online content.36 This remarkable influence over how 
individuals engage and consume online is the product of over a decade of 
strategic internal growth, as well as the acquisition of potential competitors and 
the integration of their user traffic and functionality within the Facebook 
structure.  
Remarkably, Facebook’s ascendancy in concert with its numerous 
acquisitions stimulated little interest by the antitrust agencies. A march to 
dominance, accompanied by numerous acquisitions of potential competitors, 
puts Facebook’s strategy directly within the merger regulatory power of the 
government through its ability to enforce § 7 of the Clayton Act.37 Yet, few of 
 
 33. For example, in 2010 Facebook absorbed and closed Divvyshot, a photo sharing service with functions 
integrated across Flickr, Twitter, and Facebook. Erick Schonfeld, Facebook Buys Up Divvyshot to Make 
Facebook Photos Even Better, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 2, 2010, 12:46 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2010/ 
04/02/facebook-buys-up-divvyshot-to-make-facebook-photos-even-better/. Divvyshot’s staff transitioned to 
work on Facebook Photos. Josh Constine, Facebook Hires Team from Android Photosharing App Dev Lightbox 
to Quiet Mobile Fears, TECHCRUNCH (May 15, 2012, 9:15 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2012/05/15/facebook-
lightbox/ [hereinafter Constine, Facebook Hires Team]. In May 2011, after the announcement of the Instagram 
acquisition, Facebook acquired and closed Lightbox, an Android-native social photo app that was perceived as 
an “Instagram killer” before Instagram’s Android launch. Emil Protalinski, Facebook Acquires Mobile Photo 
Sharing Startup Lightbox, ZDNET (May 15, 2012, 10:38 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-
acquires-mobile-photo-sharing-startup-lightbox/; Naina Khedekar, Interview with Stephen Robert Morse from 
Lightbox, FIRSTPOST (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.firstpost.com/tech/news-analysis/interview-with-stephen-
robert-morse-from-lightbox-3593563.html. More recently, Facebook purchased the popular social polling 
application for teens tbh. Josh Constine, Facebook Acquires Anonymous Teen Compliment App tbh, Will Let It 
Run, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 16, 2017, 1:04 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/16/facebook-acquires-
anonymous-teen-compliment-app-tbh-will-let-it-run/. Facebook allowed tbh to operate under its own brand 
name for eight months before terminating the application due to low usage. Jacob Kastrenakes, Facebook Is 
Shutting Down a Teen App It Bought Eight Months Ago, VERGE (July 2, 2018, 8:06 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/2/17528896/facebook-tbh-moves-hello-shut-down-low-usage; Ingrid 
Lunden, Facebook Is Shutting Down Hello, Moves and the Anonymous Teen App tbh Due to ‘Low Usage’, 
TECHCRUNCH (July 2, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/02/facebook-is-shutting-down-hello-
moves-and-the-anonymous-teen-app-tbh-due-to-low-usage/. 
 34. The Top 500 Sites on the Web, ALEXA, https://www.alexa.com/topsites (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 35. Max Zahn, Facebook Owns 4 of the Top 5 Most Downloaded Apps, YAHOO FIN. (July 25, 2019), 
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/facebook-messenger-whatsapp-instagram-125929036.html; Apple Presents the 
Best of 2018, APPLE (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/12/apple-presents-the-best-of-
2018/; Best of 2019: The Year’s Top Apps, APPLE, https://apps.apple.com/us/story/id1484100916 (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2021); Most Popular Apps, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/store/most-popular/apps/pc 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 36. Sarah Perez, Facebook Is Now a Major Mobile Browser in U.S., with 10%+ Market Share in Many 
States, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 6, 2018, 8:12 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/06/facebook-is-now-a-major-
mobile-browser-in-u-s-with-10-market-share-in-many-states/. 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
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the acquisitions faced review from antitrust authorities in the United States. In 
2012, the FTC conducted a nonpublic investigation of the $1 billion Facebook-
Instagram merger and did not recommend any further action.38 In 2014, U.S. 
regulators cleared Facebook’s $19 billion acquisition of the messaging 
application WhatsApp, though the FTC did send both companies a letter 
reminding them of their obligation to maintain privacy practices in accordance 
with the WhatsApp user agreement in place at the time that user data was 
collected.39  
Unlike many other companies acquired by Facebook, Instagram and 
WhatsApp remained separate from Facebook’s social network in branding until 
2019, and in some features of interoperability and data autonomy. They are also 
globally important market leaders in social networking, photo sharing, and 
instant messaging. The scale, innovation, and popularity of these products have 
made them frequent examples of potential competitors both at the times of the 
acquisitions and in the years since.  
The question arises why the federal antitrust enforcement agencies 
demonstrated reluctance to seriously confront the competitive impact of these 
and similar mergers among high tech companies. We argue below that the 
potential competition doctrine, as developed during the years of the influence of 
the Chicago School of antitrust,40 has played an important role in insulating 
acquisitions of startups by the dominant tech companies from the levels of 
antitrust scrutiny necessary to protect consumers and the competitive process in 
technology markets. 
II.  THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE 
Facebook and other Big Tech companies maintain their market dominance 
by harnessing the network effects that reinforce user value in the consumer-
facing market and advertiser benefits in digital advertising markets. Innovative 
startup firms provide competitive pressure in these markets despite the tendency 
toward tipping when small firms exist that have the potential to rapidly siphon 
off users to more desirable or innovative platforms, collect valuable data on end 
users, or both. In this context, the acquisition of startup companies may benefit 
the dominant firm by reducing the disciplining competitive pressure of potential 
entrants on the periphery of the market or by preventing future entry and 
expansion by such firms that could undermine the incumbent’s dominance. 
Under the common law of antitrust, an acquisition of a potential entrant is 
 
 38. Letter from April J. Tabor, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Thomas O. Barnett, Esq., 
Covington & Burling LLP (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/ 
facebook-inc./instagram-inc./120822barnettfacebookcltr.pdf. 
 39. Letter from Jessica L. Rich, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Prot., to Erin Egan, Chief Priv. Officer, 
Facebook Inc. & Anne Hoge, Gen. Couns., WhatsApp Inc. (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_statements/297701/140410facebookwhatappltr.pdf. 
 40. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 226–29 (1985). 
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analyzed under the potential competition doctrine.41 Thus, to understand the 
ability and potential to regulate acquisitions by dominant tech firms it is 
important to understand how the law of potential competition mergers developed 
and why it has been so underutilized to date. 
The history of the potential competition doctrine informs the analysis of 
tech industry acquisitions because it demonstrates how a shift in the standard of 
analysis beginning in the 1960s and culminating in the 1974 United States v. 
Marine Bancorporation decision undermined the applicability of the doctrine in 
a range of contexts including online platform markets. The potential competition 
doctrine emerged in the aftermath of the 1950 Amendment to § 7 of the Clayton 
Act.42 As described by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe v. United States, the 
“dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 
amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic 
concentration in the American economy.”43 In 1963, the Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, explained that the “intense 
congressional concern” about increasing concentration “warrants dispensing, in 
certain cases, with elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or 
probable anticompetitive effects.”44  
Under this standard, expectations of the market-disciplining effects of 
potential competition operated to preserve competition in cases where the 
doctrine applied. The Court explained that when there is a structural increase in 
concentration due to a merger, the merger “is so inherently likely to lessen 
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence 
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive 
effects.”45 Thus, the Court created a presumption of an anticompetitive effect 
from a structural increase in concentration, placing the burden on the merging 
parties to refute the presumption. The plaintiff would still be required to define 
the relevant markets involved and measure market shares and concentration, but 
a full-blown analysis of the impact of the merger was judged by the Court to be 
unrealistic and counter to the congressional intent to stem the rising levels of 
concentration in the United States.46 
The Court’s approach is often referred to as a “structural approach,” which 
is shorthand for the belief that mergers above a certain concentration threshold 
 
 41. For a discussion of the merger guidelines and potential competition, see infra notes 75–78 and 
accompanying text. 
 42. Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950); Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition 
Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1977). 
 43. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962). 
 44. United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). 
 45. Id. (citing United States v. Koppers Co., 202 F. Supp. 437 (W.D. Pa. 1962)).  
 46. Today the analysis of a relevant market can involve sophisticated economic techniques and analysis of 
data. See Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129 (2007). 
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have a reasonable probability of harming competition.47 The structural approach 
to merger analysis contrasts to the effects-based approach, which requires a 
prediction of the future competitive effects of the merger by use of detailed 
economic analysis. The Philadelphia Bank opinion implicitly rejected the 
effects-based approach because of its intractability.48 As the Eighth Circuit later 
commented, the structural approach is preferable in cases concerning potential 
competition since “proof of liability under either [potential competition] theory 
is certain to entail expensive, uncertain litigation, even if, as here, the acquiring 
firm is rich and powerful and the acquired firm’s market highly concentrated.”49 
The practical requirements of proving the competitive effects of the threat of 
entry were deemed nearly insurmountable despite the importance of these 
effects. 
  In contrast to the Philadelphia Bank paradigm, later Supreme Court cases 
developed an unworkable legal standard for the potential competition doctrine. 
The Court imposed an initial stage open-ended proof requirement involving 
prediction of future conduct and performance that could not be practically 
discharged. In developing this standard, the Court divided potential competition 
into two separate legal doctrines—the actual potential competition doctrine50 
and the perceived potential competition doctrine51—with distinct evidentiary 
requirements. After separating actual and perceived potential competition, the 
Court twice expressed doubt regarding the viability of the actual potential 
competition doctrine.52 In these cases, the Court discussed the actual potential 
competition doctrine primarily in the context of acquisitions targeting a 
dominant firm, and not the context relevant to the current Big Tech mergers in 
which a dominant firm targets a startup.  
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of harm to potential 
competition from a merger one year after the Philadelphia Bank decision in 
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.53 This case provides important insights 
 
 47. Jonathan Baker refers to this approach as “truncated condemnation.” BAKER, supra note 16, at 142 
(“Condemnation is described as truncated because it does not require a comprehensive analysis of the nature, 
history, purpose, and actual or probable effect of the practice evaluated.”). 
 48. Brodley, supra note 42, at 8–9. 
 49. Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 1229, 1234 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 50. Actual potential competition denoted the future increase in rivalry from the entry itself. “Actual 
potential competition occurs when the potential competitor is not having a present procompetitive effect on the 
market, but considerable evidence exists that the uncommitted firm is going to enter the market. The competitive 
effect from actual potential competition occurs in the future.” Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the 
Potential Competition Doctrine, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1035, 1046 (2004). 
 51. Perceived potential competition referred to the pre-entry competitive restraint of the potential entrant. 
“This theory states that a given transaction may remove present procompetitive influences that the acquired firm 
has on the target market, which stems from the target market’s perceptions of the acquired firm’s ability to enter 
the target market.” Henry S. Klimowicz, Comment, Reinvigorating the Perceived Potential Competition 
Theory: An Analysis of the Potential Competition Doctrine and FTC v. Steris Corp., 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 
173, 177 (2018). 
 52. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 639 (1974); United States v. Falstaff 
Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973). 
 53. United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 652 (1964). 
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for the viability of the potential competition doctrine to Big Tech mergers since 
it is the chief example of the doctrine applied to a case where the potential entrant 
is the target firm. The case involved the merger between two natural gas pipeline 
companies and their impact on the California market. El Paso Natural Gas was 
the only supplier of natural gas to California when it attempted to acquire Pacific 
Northwest.54 The Court noted that Pacific Northwest had attempted to enter the 
California market by supplying Canadian natural gas to one of El Paso’s 
customers in Southern California, Southern California Edison Co.55 The deal fell 
through only when El Paso agreed to a more favorable contract with its 
customer.56 The Court conceived of the potential harm from the merger as the 
elimination of influence of the potential entrant on El Paso, or the perceived 
potential competitive impact of Pacific Northwest.57 Pacific Northwest’s threat 
of entry forced El Paso to act competitively, despite the company’s monopoly 
in the California market.58 The evidence showed that El Paso did prevent Pacific 
Northwest’s entry by matching and exceeding Pacific Northwest’s offer to a 
California customer. If Pacific Northwest had captured the customer, it would 
have entered the market.59 Nevertheless, the Court chose to focus on the current 
impact of the entry attempt on El Paso’s bid, rather than the more significant 
future impact Pacific Northwest might have had had it become a competitor in 
the California market.60 The Supreme Court would follow this emphasis on the 
impact of perceived potential competition in subsequent cases. 
In the same year, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in another potential 
competition case. In United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., the Court 
appeared to reject the structural approach of Philadelphia Bank, defaulting to a 
vague, open-ended analysis. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. involved a joint venture 
rather than a merger.61 All joint ventures raise potential competition issues 
because absent the joint venture one or both of the same companies might enter 
into the market alone.62  
In the Court’s analysis, the joint venture eliminated a perceived potential 
entrant, removing the impact of an “aggressive, well equipped and well financed 
corporation engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously 
to enter an oligopolistic market” which disciplined the existing competitors.63 
 
 54. Id. at 658. 
 55. Id. at 654.   
 56. Id. at 654–55. 
 57. As the Court stated, “[w]e would have to wear blinders not to see that the mere efforts of Pacific 
Northwest to get into the California market, though unsuccessful, had a powerful influence on El Paso’s business 
attitudes within the State.” Id. at 659. 
 58. Id. at 655. 
 59. See id. at 661. 
 60. Id.  
 61. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 160 (1964). 
 62. See William M. Landes, Harm to Competition: Cartels, Mergers and Joint Ventures, 52 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 625, 630–31 (1983).  
 63. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. at 174.  
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Citing the El Paso Natural Gas case, the Court stated that potential competition 
“is not ‘susceptible of a ready and precise answer.’”64 It stated that analysis of 
the impact of a potential entrant depends on “‘the nature or extent of that market 
and by the nearness of the absorbed company to it, that company’s eagerness to 
enter that market, its resourcefulness, and so on.’”65  
In Philadelphia Bank, the Court had addressed the comparable 
complications of predicting the future effects of a horizontal merger by 
establishing structural judicial guidelines. Now, when addressing a parallel 
prediction of the impact of a potential competitor, the Court surprisingly 
defaulted to an ambiguous and open-ended narrative. The Court might be 
forgiven because it resolved the controversy by remanding the case back to the 
lower court to consider the perceived potential competition impact of the joint 
venture, but it did so without clear guidance on how such an analysis should 
proceed. In so doing, the case set a precedent in which the structural approach 
to potential competition was set aside in favor of a range of claims and 
presumptions about the intentions and perceptions of merging firms.  
In 1967, the Supreme Court again confronted a potential competition 
problem in Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble Co., and moved 
the doctrine closer to the unworkable effects-based approach deduced from a 
subjective and imprecise evaluation of competitive conditions.66 Following the 
acquisition of Clorox Chemical by Procter & Gamble, the FTC blocked the 
merger, asserting, among other reasons, that Procter & Gamble was likely to 
enter the bleach market absent the acquisition.67 Procter & Gamble was a 
potential competitor in the market and had already launched an abrasive cleaner 
that was a differentiated substitute for liquid bleach.68 Procter & Gamble knew 
the liquid cleaning business, the customers of Clorox and Procter & Gamble 
largely overlapped, and the company advertised and merchandised in the same 
manner as Clorox.69 All of the factors led the FTC to conclude that the 
acquisition of Clorox by Procter & Gamble would eliminate a likely entrant into 
the liquid bleach market.70 Yet the court of appeals rejected the evidence of the 
closeness and proximity of the two markets and declared that there was 
insufficient evidence from the management of Proctor & Gamble that it intended 
to enter the liquid bleach market.71  
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,72 but without offering a 
helpful analysis of the potential competition issues. The Court abstained from 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (quoting El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. at 660).  
 66. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967). 
 67. Id. at 577–81. 
 68. Id. at 580.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 581. 
 71. Id. at 575–81.  
 72. Id. at 581.   
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analysis of actual potential competition and focused solely on the impact of 
Procter & Gamble as a restraining perceived potential competitor, even though 
the Court opined that it was “the most likely entrant” into the liquid bleach 
market.73 The Court also found, without explaining its basis, that Procter & 
Gamble did not face a barrier to entry and that “the number of potential entrants 
was not so large that the elimination of one would be insignificant.”74 The focus 
of the court of appeals and the Supreme Court on aspects of competition such as 
the potential competitor’s intention of entry, the likelihood of entry, and the 
number of potential entrants would support the inclusion of such difficult and 
even subjective or illusory criteria in the evidentiary standards for potential 
competition cases.  
In 1968, the Department of Justice issued Merger Guidelines.75 While the 
Supreme Court was grappling with the early cases involving mergers that harm 
competition by preventing future entry, the Department of Justice developed a 
clear policy to protect new entry from mergers by dominant firms. According to 
the 1968 Merger Guidelines:  
Since potential competition (i.e., the threat of entry, either through internal 
expansion or through acquisition and expansion of a small firm, by firms not 
already or only marginally in the market) may often be the most significant 
competitive limitation on the exercise of market power by leading firms, as 
well as the most likely source of additional actual competition, the Department 
will ordinarily challenge any merger between one of the most likely entrants 
in the market [and a firm with a large share of the relevant market.]76 
The acquiring or target firm must be one with the ability and incentive to 
enter and must be “one of the most likely potential entrants into the market.”77 
As discussed in a later Part of this Article, the 1968 Merger Guidelines faltered 
when addressing the evidentiary burden required to show that a target is one of 
the most likely potential entrants.78 
The 1968 Merger Guidelines’ explanation of the required evidence to 
demonstrate potential entry is not a model of clarity. It requires that the 
Department of Justice marshal evidence demonstrating that entry by the firm 
 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf. 
 76. Id. § 18. 
 77. Id.  
 78. See discussion infra Part III. According to the 1968 Guidelines:  
  In determining whether a firm is one of the most likely potential entrants into a market, the 
Department accords primary significance to the firm’s capability of entering on a competitively 
significant scale relative to the capability of other firms (i.e., the technological and financial resources 
available to it) and to the firm’s economic incentive to enter (evidenced by, for example, the general 
attractiveness of the market in terms of risk and profit; or any special relationship of the firm to the 
market; or the firm’s manifested interest in entry; or the natural expansion pattern of the firm; or the 
like).  
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 75, § 18(a)(iv). 
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would be more profitable and less risky than other unidentified non-litigant 
third-party firms. In 1984, the Department of Justice would give more structure 
to this inquiry but would continue to require unworkable conduct and 
performance evidence that would make the potential competition analysis 
impractical and infrequent. 
More clarity emerged from the Supreme Court’s 1973 opinion in United 
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.79 The case involved the acquisition of 
Narragansett Brewing by Falstaff. 80 Narragansett produced beer sold in the New 
England regional geographic market.81 Falstaff sold beer in thirty-two states and 
was the largest beer producer not in the New England market.82 The district court 
considered both the theory that Falstaff disciplined competition as a potential 
entrant and that Falstaff was a future actual entrant into New England.83 The 
district court held that evidence from Falstaff’s management cast doubt on 
whether Falstaff was going to enter the New England market and that 
competition had not decreased since the consummated acquisition.84 Again, 
despite acknowledging the pertinence of the actual potential competition 
doctrine, in their decision the Supreme Court focused solely on the perceived 
potential competition aspect of the situation in which the merger “eliminates a 
potential competitor exercising present influence on the market.”85 The district 
court erred by assuming that the subjective evidence from Falstaff’s 
management meant that, as a matter of fact, Falstaff was not a potential entrant.86 
Instead, the district court should have considered the objective evidence.87 
If the district court’s approach had prevailed, it would have meant that 
plaintiffs asserting potential competition cases could be defeated by the 
uncontroverted testimony of the management of one of the merging entities.88 
Instead, the Court thought that the proper inquiry was whether a rational 
incumbent firm would have perceived the acquirer as a likely entrant. It stated 
that “if it would appear to rational beer merchants in New England that Falstaff 
 
 79. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973). 
 80. Id. at 527.  
 81. Id. at 528.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 530. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 532. 
 86. Id. at 533. 
 87. According to the Supreme Court:  
  The specific question with respect to this phase of the case is not what Falstaff’s internal company 
decisions were but whether, given its financial capabilities and conditions in the New England 
market, it would be reasonable to consider it a potential entrant into that market. . . . The District 
Court should therefore have appraised the economic facts about Falstaff and the New England market 
in order to determine whether in any realistic sense Falstaff could be said to be a potential competitor 
on the fringe of the market with likely influence on existing competition. 
Id. at 533–34.  
 88. This lesson would be overlooked by subsequent lower court opinions discussed below. See discussion 
infra Part III.  
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might well build a new brewery to supply the northeastern market then its entry 
by merger becomes suspect under § 7.”89 However, the Court does not inform 
us concerning what “economic facts about Falstaff and the New England 
market” should have been analyzed or what objective evidence should be 
consulted in order to ascertain the beliefs of a rational beer merchant.90 It appears 
that a complex, open-ended inquiry of this nature would lead to an 
unmanageable problem for a court. For an actual potential competition case, the 
Court offered even less, declining to even hold that a merger that prevents actual 
entry violates § 7 of the Clayton Act.91 
The Court’s reluctance is puzzling. As described by Joseph Brodley,92 the 
Court has ample scope to apply and interpret the actual potential competition 
doctrine in both law and precedent. In early Supreme Court cases, the Sherman 
Act has been held to cover actual potential competition,93 and the Clayton Act 
“is an incipiency statute designed to prevent [mergers] that are beyond the scope 
of the Sherman Act.”94 
The last and most influential Supreme Court case addressing the potential 
competition doctrine is United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.95 The 1974 
opinion, penned by Justice Powell, established the extraordinarily high 
requirements of proof that inoculate potentially anticompetitive mergers from 
scrutiny under the potential competition doctrine today. The case concerned the 
acquisition by Marine Bancorporation, a large Seattle-based bank, of the 
Washington Trust Bank, a smaller bank headquartered in Spokane, 
Washington.96 The government challenged the merger on both perceived and 
actual potential competition grounds.97 It argued that Marine Bancorporation’s 
presence on the fringe of the Spokane market disciplined Spokane competitors, 
and that absent the merger, Marine Bancorporation would likely enter the 
Spokane market.98 
 
 89. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 533. 
 90. Id. at 533–36. 
 91. The Court’s punt was hardly convincing:  
We leave for another day the question of the applicability of § 7 to a merger that will leave 
competition in the marketplace exactly as it was, neither hurt nor helped, and that is challengeable 
under § 7 only on grounds that the company could, but did not, enter de novo or through “toe-hold” 
acquisition and that there is less competition than there would have been had entry been in such a 
manner. 
Id. at 537.   
 92. Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition Under the Merger Guidelines, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 376, 381 
(1983). 
 93. E.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); United States v. Trenton Potteries 
Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). 
 94. Brodley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 381. 
 95. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). 
 96. Id. at 605.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 605, 633. 
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The district court found against the government because Washington’s 
state banking regulations prevented the kind of entry the government’s theories 
predicted.99 The Supreme Court affirmed, but this time took the opportunity to 
develop a general methodology for analyzing actual potential competition 
mergers.100 According to the Court, “[t]wo essential preconditions must exist” 
before an actual potential competition theory “establishes a violation of § 7.”101 
First, that the potential competitor could enter the market at issue absent the 
merger. Second, that such entry would produce a likelihood of deconcentration 
or other significant procompetitive effects.102 Moreover, with respect to the first 
prong, the Court implied that “unequivocal proof” of actual future de novo entry 
is required.103 The standard of proof for the second prong is also exacting. The 
potential entry must accomplish more than simply increased competitive rivalry. 
It must deconcentrate the market or accomplish another “significant” but 
unspecified procompetitive transformation. Moreover, the Court expressed 
doubt that an actual potential competition case would be viable, even when these 
exacting standards are met.104 Because the government did not meet its burden 
regarding Marine Bancorporation, the Court would “express no view on the 
appropriate resolution of the question reserved in Falstaff.”105 
Lower court interpretations of the binding precedent set forth in Marine 
Bancorporation demonstrate both the unworkable nature of the proof 
requirements and the difficulties attendant to requiring the judiciary to grapple 
with complicated conduct and performance predictions. For example, a few 
years after the Marine Bancorporation decision, the Fourth Circuit considered a 
potential competition claim by the FTC in 1977 in Federal Trade Commission 
v. Atlantic Richfield Co.106 The case involved the acquisition of Anaconda, a 
copper and aluminum mining and processing company, by ARCO, a large oil 
and petroleum company.107 The FTC claimed that ARCO was a likely entrant 
into the copper market.108 The Court interpreted Supreme Court precedent to 
require “clear proof” of entry (citing to the Marine Bancorporation standard of 
 
 99. Id. at 639–40. 
 100. For the perceived potential competition theory, the required showing is that the acquired firm is a 
perceived entrant and that this perception “tempers” noncompetitive behavior in the market. Id. at 640. 
 101. Id. at 633. However, in another part of the opinion, the Court states that “[i]ndeed, since the 
preconditions for that theory are not present, we do not reach it, and therefore we express no view on the 
appropriate resolution of the question reserved in Falstaff.” Id. at 639. In Fraser v. Major League Soccer, the 
Court refused to find that § 7 of the Clayton Act can be violated by the elimination of actual potential 
competition. See 284 F.3d 47, 70–71 (1st Cir. 2002). The Court stated that “[i]t is uncertain how the Supreme 
Court will ultimately resolve the issue.” Id. at 70.  
 102. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 633. 
 103. See id. at 624.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 639. 
 106. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 291 (4th Cir. 1977). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 292–95.  
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“unequivocal proof”).109 The Court then relied on the testimony of ARCO’s 
management.110 This is precisely the type of evidence eschewed by Falstaff. The 
Court found that “Arco would never seriously consider original entry or entry 
by toehold acquisition.”111 Lack of proof of entry also doomed the government’s 
cases in British Oxygen Co. International v. Federal Trade Commission,112 
Tenneco, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,113 United States v. Siemens 
Corp.,114 and Fraser v. Major League Soccer.115  
The Fifth Circuit, in Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System,116 set forth a detailed analysis of its understanding of 
the proof requirements of an actual potential competition violation of the 
Clayton Act.117 According to that court, the required elements are: (1) a 
concentrated market; (2) no other potential entrants exist other than the target 
(or acquirer); (3) probability of procompetitive entry; and (4) procompetitive 
effects of independent entry.118 The court stated that when there are several 
potential entrants, the elimination of any one entrant would not be significant.119 
It then added, following Richard Posner, that “[e]conomic theory suggests that, 
where oligopoly profits are available, a multitude of firms will eagerly seek to 
enter the market.”120 Thus, the proponent of an actual potential competition case 
must show in the Fifth Circuit, contrary to the general case, that the specific facts 
at issue suggest that only the target (or acquiring) firm is a likely entrant. Thus, 
the court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the actual potential 
competition was “significant” because of the presence of other unanalyzed 
 
 109. Id. at 294; see United States v. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499, 506–07 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Assuming that 
the theory of elimination of actual potential competition may be the basis of preliminary injunctive relief, about 
which some respected authorities have voiced understandable doubt, there must, for purposes of determining 
whether such relief is appropriate, be at least a ‘reasonable probability’ that the acquiring firm would enter the 
market, and preferably clear proof that entry would occur . . . .” (citations omitted)). But see Yamaha Motor Co. 
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 657 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1981) (requiring that the potential entrant have “available 
feasible means” for entering the relevant market, not clear proof of eventual entry (quoting Marine 
Bancorporation Inc., 418 U.S. at 633)). 
 110.  Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d at 296.  
 111. Id. at 297. 
 112. Brit. Oxygen Co. Int’l v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 557 F.2d 24, 29–30 (2d  Cir. 1977).  
 113. Tenneco, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 689 F.2d 346, 357–58 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 114. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d at 504. 
 115. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 116. Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 117. Id. at 1266–68. 
 118. The Fifth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit and require “entry of the outside firm must 
appear to be certain.” Id. at 1268. Instead, it endorsed a standard of proof of “reasonable probability” of entry. 
Id. 
 119. Id. at 1267. 
 120. Id. Posner writes that “[t]he doctrine of potential competition was introduced into antitrust law by the 
Supreme Court, and the Court can abandon it—and should do so.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 123 (1976). Posner’s critique of the potential competition doctrine is that it is 
impossible to determine the universe of potential entrants at any time, let alone the likelihood that each would 
enter. See id.  
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potential entrants and that there was insufficient evidence that entry would have 
had a “significant” procompetitive effect.121  
The Department of Justice addressed the potential competition issue again 
in the 1982 Merger Guidelines drafted by appointees of Ronald Reagan, who 
were heavily influenced by the Chicago School of Economics.122 They were 
revised in 1984, and this was the last time potential competition mergers are 
addressed by the Merger Guidelines.123 The 1984 Merger Guidelines built upon 
but also significantly revised the Department of Justice’s position developed in 
the 1968 Merger Guidelines. The 1984 Merger Guidelines treated perceived and 
actual potential competition together, thus implicitly rejecting the artificial 
division made by the Supreme Court. The Department of Justice considered four 
factors. First, the acquired firm’s market must be concentrated, above 1800 
HHI.124 Second, the acquiring firm must have specific entry advantages; 
otherwise, the elimination of the target still leaves many potential entrants. The 
number of firms likely to enter should be less than three. If there are more than 
three likely entrants then there must be direct evidence of likely entry. Third, the 
target must have a larger market share of twenty percent or more to make a 
challenge likely. Fourth, the 1984 Merger Guidelines required an analysis of the 
efficiencies of the proposed merger.125  
The 1984 Merger Guidelines were both a step forward and a step back from 
the 1968 Merger Guidelines. Unlike the 1968 Merger Guidelines, the 1984 
version assumed that the acquiring firm is the potential entrant. The Department 
of Justice should have made clear that the potential competition doctrine can be 
applied in either direction; a merger can prevent entry by the acquiring firm or 
the acquired firm. The 1984 Merger Guidelines further provide that where entry 
is easy no merger challenge will be undertaken.126 This is a step backward from 
the 1968 Merger Guidelines. The 1984 Merger Guidelines never define ease of 
entry. At most, the 1984 Merger Guidelines declared that ease of entry is the 
likelihood and probable magnitude of entry in response to a small but significant 
and nontransitory increase in price.127 While the newer version of the Merger 
Guidelines added structure to the more opaque 1968 Merger Guidelines, it relied 
on another undefined concept, “entry advantage.” As the antitrust scholar Joseph 
 
 121. The government prevailed on its potential competition claims in Polypore International v. Federal 
Trade Commission, 686 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2012) and Yamaha v. Federal Trade Commission, 657 F.2d 971 
(8th Cir. 1981). 
 122. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11248.pdf. 
 123. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11249.pdf. 
 124. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration equal to the sum of 
squared market shares and bounded between 0 and 10,000. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 123, § 3.1. Markets 
demonstrating an HHI of greater than 1800 are considered highly concentrated. Id. 
 125. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 123, § 4.13 et seq.  
 126. Id. § 3.3. 
 127. See id. 
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Brodley points out, the most probable market entrant under the analytical 
structure of the 1984 Merger Guidelines is the firm that would achieve the 
greatest anticipated return from entry.128 According to Professor Brodley, 
“[c]ourts lack the expertise to resolve complex and speculative factual issues as 
to future costs and economic conditions. The cases are bound to be burdensome 
and expensive, especially when competing experts escalate the subtlety of the 
analysis.”129 
Professor Brodley is correct. Analysis of entry under the Merger 
Guidelines requires a fairly sophisticated predictive financial analysis. To 
require a similar analysis for firms that are not parties to the analysis appears 
intractable.  
Thus, the plaintiff asserting a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act against a 
dominant firm in a digital market seeking to acquire a startup based on actual 
potential competition has a difficult uphill climb. First, many circuits do not 
recognize a reduction of actual potential competition as a viable theory under 
§ 7 of the Clayton Act. Second, most courts, but not all, have considered the 
situation where the acquirer is the potential entrant rather than the incumbent, 
dominant firm. Third, the courts have demanded a high standard of proof for 
demonstrating that the startup would likely enter the market dominated by the 
acquirer. Fourth, even where entry is likely, the courts require that the target be 
uniquely situated to enter and not be one of many potential entrants. Fifth, the 
courts require proof that the startup’s entry will significantly reduce the 
dominance of the dominant firm in its relevant market. These onerous 
requirements would deter even the most committed antitrust enforcer or 
plaintiff. 
III.  APPLICATION OF THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE TO THE 
INSTAGRAM AND WHATSAPP MERGERS 
In this Part of the Article, we describe the difficulty of applying the 
potential competition doctrine to Facebook’s widely criticized acquisitions of 
Instagram and WhatsApp. Our intent is not to demonstrate that these acquisitions 
were anticompetitive but to show that the potential competition doctrine as 
presently formulated does not allow for a serious inquiry into tech mergers.130 
 
 128. Brodley, supra note 92, at 390 (discussing the 1982 Merger Guidelines). The 1982 and 1984 Merger 
Guidelines treat potential competition mergers in an equivalent way. The 1984 Merger Guidelines added a 
sentence stating that efficiencies will be considered. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 123, § 3.5. 
 129. Brodley, supra note 92, at 391. 
 130. Many commentators have suggested that the Instagram acquisition was anticompetitive. E.g., BAKER, 
supra note 16, at 161 (“Consider Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram in 2012. This merger could have harmed 
future competition by reducing incentives to innovate.”); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L 
J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 740 (2018) (“One common fact pattern that can involve a loss of future competition occurs 
when a large incumbent firm acquires a highly capable firm operating in an adjacent space. This happens 
frequently in the technology sector. Prominent examples include Google’s acquisition of YouTube in 2006 and 
DoubleClick in 2007, Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram in 2012 . . . .”). 
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A.  THE INSTAGRAM ACQUISITION 
When Facebook announced its $1 billion acquisition of Instagram on April 
9, 2012, it was something of an anomaly.131 Although Facebook had made thirty-
one acquisitions up to this point, none approached the price tag paid for 
Instagram.132 However, Instagram was different, and the opportunity arose at a 
critical crossroads for Facebook. On the eve of its May 2012 IPO, Facebook was 
under great pressure by investors to increase its revenue base. At the same time, 
the rise of mobile technology and its rapid adoption by consumers created 
hurdles for Facebook to satisfy these demands.  
Two problems confronted the company as an increasing share of users 
accessed the internet from mobile devices. First, Facebook struggled to reorient 
its network from a desktop-based platform, and second, it had yet to monetize 
its mobile user base by incorporating advertising on the limited display area 
available on mobile screens.133 As other companies developed mobile-first 
applications that optimized web access using smartphones, Facebook elected to 
invest in an HTML5-based multi-platform strategy. On mobile devices, their 
HTML5 approach was slower and less stable than native iOS and Android 
applications.134 At the same time, mobile-native applications with social features 
such as Instagram and Foursquare were attracting growing user numbers and 
threatened to draw user engagement away from Facebook precisely when its 
revenue base was under scrutiny.  
Photo sharing had been a key facet of Facebook’s user engagement since 
its introduction on the network. By 2009, Facebook Photos was the largest photo 
sharing service in the world.135 In ensuing years as dramatic improvements in 
smartphone camera features made photo sharing an increasingly mobile-based 
activity, Facebook struggled to adapt to the shift to mobile technology. At this 
pivotal juncture, Stanford engineering graduates Kevin Systrom and Mike 
 
 131. See Evelyn M. Rusli, Facebook Buys Instagram for $1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 9, 2012, 
1:15 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/facebook-buys-instagram-for-1-billion/. 
 132. See infra Appendix. 
 133. In Facebook’s 2012 SEC Form S-1 Registration Statement, the company records 845 million monthly 
active users, and 432 million monthly active users accessing the network through mobile products in 
December 2011. Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 29, 2013), https://s21.q4cdn.com/3996807 
38/files/doc_financials/annual_reports/FB_2012_10K.pdf. Among the company’s risk factors are two mobile-
related risks: (1) “Growth in the use of Facebook through our mobile products as a substitute for use on 
personal computers may negatively affect our revenue and financial results[;]” and, (2) “Facebook user growth 
and engagement on mobile devices depend upon effective operation with mobile operating systems, networks, 
and standards that we do not control.” Id. at 18.  
 134. MG Siegler, Facebook for iPhone Updated: No iOS 4 Support, No iPad Support, Broken UI, 
TECHCRUNCH (June 19, 2010, 6:24 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2010/06/19/facebook-iphone-app/; see also 
Drew Olanoff, Mark Zuckerberg: Our Biggest Mistake Was Betting Too Much on HTML5, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 
11, 2012, 2:20 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2012/09/11/mark-zuckerberg-our-biggest-mistake-with-mobile-
was-betting-too-much-on-html5/; Om Malik, Here Is Why Facebook Bought Instagram, GIGAOM (Apr. 9, 2012, 
11:28 AM), https://gigaom.com/2012/04/09/here-is-why-did-facebook-bought-instagram/. 
 135. Erick Schonfeld, Facebook Photos Pulls Away from the Pack, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 22, 2009, 9:15 AM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2009/02/22/facebook-photos-pulls-away-from-the-pack/.  
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Krieger launched the native iOS photo sharing social network Instagram.136 On 
Instagram, users could upload, edit, and share pictures from their iPhones and 
follow, comment, and like the images posted by others. The app also enabled 
users to post their Instagram images across social networks, including Facebook 
and Twitter. But the founders did not aim to be a mere content creator for other 
social networks. Rather, Systrom and Krieger envisioned their app as a rival to 
the incumbent social networking giants based on a community united under the 
premise that “the next network is people interested in sharing life visually.”137 
The company was poised to compete in the social networking market.138 
Within the first week of its October 6, 2010 launch on the Apple App Store, 
Instagram had garnered 100,000 user downloads.139 Ten weeks later it had 
accrued over 1 million registered users.140 The company quickly attracted the 
attention of venture capital that would allow it to scale. The firm’s initial funding 
round brought former Facebook VP of Product Management Matt Cohler to 
Instagram’s Board of Directors, who advised the company to pursue growth first 
without monetization in order to achieve the network effects that would drive 
advertising revenue later.141 One month before the company revealed its 
acquisition, just two and half years after its introduction on the App Store, 
Instagram founder Kevin Systrom announced that Instagram had reached 27 
million registered users and “Facebook-level engagement.”142 In the following 
weeks, Instagram branched out from iOS to launch on Android and brought in 1 
million new users in the first twenty-four hours.143 When Facebook and 
 
 136. Gaurav Sangwani, The Story of How Instagram Started and What Entrepreneurs Can Learn from It, 




 137. Claire Cain Miller, A Photo-Sharing App with Bigger Aspirations, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Oct. 19, 2010, 
12:00 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/a-photo-sharing-app-with-bigger-aspirations/. 
 138. As Tim Wu describes: 
  What made Instagram especially dangerous to Facebook was that it was strong where Facebook 
was weak. Instagram was native to mobile; Facebook was struggling on that platform. And photo 
sharing was incredibly fast and easy on Instagram. As business writer Nicholas Carlson observed, 
Instagram “allows people to do what they like to do on Facebook easier and faster.” Perhaps even 
more alarming, Instagram appealed to a younger demographic and had a cachet that Facebook was 
starting to lose. 
Tim Wu, The Case for Breaking Up Facebook and Instagram, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2018, 10:11 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/09/28/case-breaking-up-facebook-instagram/. 
 139. MG Siegler, Instagram Captures 100,000 Mobile Photo Addicts in Less Than a Week, TECHCRUNCH 
(Oct. 13, 2010, 1:02 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2010/10/13/instagram-users/. 
 140. MG Siegler, Instagram Captures a Million Users. Up Next: API, Android, and Funding, 
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 21, 2012, 3:20 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2010/12/21/instagram-one-million/. 
 141. Kim-Mai Cutler, From 0 to $1 Billion in Two Years: Instagram’s Rose-Tinted Ride to Glory, 
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 9, 2012, 6:14 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2012/04/09/instagram-story-facebook-
acquisition/. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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Instagram announced the acquisition six days after the Android launch, 
Instagram had over 30 million users and just thirteen employees.144  
According to Silicon Valley folklore, Zuckerberg invited Systrom to his 
home on a Saturday. By Monday the billion-dollar deal was done.145 Observers 
at the time registered their suspicions that the acquisition was an act of 
“squashing a potential rival” and pointed to the impending monetization of 
Instagram as a source of competition that could have driven down prices in 
online advertising markets.146 The merger triggered a Hart-Scott-Rodino filing, 
but ultimately the antitrust agencies took no action. The FTC investigation was 
nonpublic and enforcers did not disclose the basis for their decision at the 
time.147 One likely obstacle was the user price of zero set by Facebook and 
Instagram for their social networking services, which complicates estimates of 
markups above the competitive price or estimates of entry in response to a small 
price increase. In the social networking market, companies compete for user 
attention. The consumer-facing market generally has a price of zero, with 
services monetized in the advertising market by selling access to the user 
attention captured on the social network. Instagram operated in the social 
networking market and it was encouraging users to defect from Facebook to 
Instagram, but the competitive dimensions of this market are challenging to 
measure and interpret since users may participate on both networks and neither 
network charged for the services involved.148 Several economists have offered 
solutions to this problem, including measures of user engagement such as the 
 
 144. Thomas Houston, Facebook to Buy Instagram for $1 Billion, VERGE (Apr. 9, 2012, 1:06 PM), 
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 146. In The New York Times, Somini Sengupta points directly at issues of potential competition, 
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PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-instagram/ftc-clears-facebooks-acquisition-of-instagram-id 
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 148. See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1509 (2019). 
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number of users or the amount of time spent on a website.149 By any reasonable 
measure, Instagram was already a competitor.150  
In contrast, advertising markets are not free. Digital advertising market 
analysts widely acknowledge the dominance of a duopoly in digital advertising 
composed of Google and Facebook, which jointly claim approximately 60% of 
total revenue in the market.151 For Facebook that dominance amounted to $16.6 
billion in advertising income during the second quarter of 2019 and more than 
98% of its total revenue.152 Facebook’s advertising market power is even more 
significant when compared to similar advertising platforms. For example, during 
the 2007 investigation of the Google/DoubleClick merger, the FTC determined 
that search advertising (advertising delivered in response to a consumer search 
query) should be separated from display advertising (including image, video, 
rich media, etc., purchased on a webpage).153 According to the FTC, “the 
evidence shows that the sale of search advertising does not operate as a 
significant constraint on the prices or quality of other online advertising sold 
directly or indirectly by publishers or vice versa.”154  
Today, Facebook leads the market in digital display advertising with a 
market share of over 40%.155 Arguably, an even smaller relevant market might 
exist for advertising on social networks.156 In 2011 and 2012, as Facebook 
struggled to monetize its mobile user base, Google and Facebook battled for the 
top spot, each controlling about 14% of the digital display advertising market in 
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 150. According to Facebook’s 2012 Annual Report, the company believed that Instagram was drawing users 
away from engagement with Facebook, stating, “We believe that some of our users have reduced their 
engagement with Facebook in favor of increased engagement with other products and services such as 
Instagram.” Facebook Inc., supra note 133, at 19.  
 151. US Digital Ad Spending Will Surpass Traditional in 2019, EMARKETER (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.emarketer.com/content/us-digital-ad-spending-will-surpass-traditional-in-2019; APPNEXUS, THE 
DIGITAL ADVERTISING STATS YOU NEED FOR 2018, at 49 (2018), https://www.appnexus.com/sites/default/ 
files/whitepapers/guide-2018stats_2.pdf. 
 152. FACEBOOK INC., INVESTOR RELATIONS, FACEBOOK Q2 2019 RESULTS (2019), https://s21.q4cdn.com/ 
399680738/files/doc_financials/2019/Q2/Q2-2019-Earnings-Presentation-07.24.2019.pdf. 
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 154. Id. at 3.  
 155. Ginny Marvin, Report: Facebook’s Display Ad Domination to Grow as US Digital Ad Spend Hits $83B 
in 2017, MARKETING LAND (Mar. 14, 2017, 9:38 AM), https://marketingland.com/emarketer-facebook-
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close rivals in an innovation market and a future product market for advertising on social media platforms.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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2011 and 15% in 2012.157 At the time of the merger, the majority of Facebook’s 
revenue came from display advertising.158 Instagram did not sell advertising at 
the time of the acquisition, but it had been working directly with brands to 
support image-oriented ways of connecting companies with users.159 As the 
Instagram network grew, more businesses saw it as an important medium to 
reach consumers.160 When Instagram was ready for monetization, it would be 
unlikely to charge users for social networking services in a market where the 
going price was zero. Once Instagram introduced advertising it would likely 
compete with Facebook in the digital display advertising market as well as social 
networking. Instagram was an actual potential entrant in both of these markets. 
Thus, the Instagram merger presented a classic case of a potential competition 
merger under § 7 of the Clayton Act.  
Although the FTC did not outline the considerations that guided its 
investigation, in August 2012 the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) published an outline of its decision to refrain from referring the Instagram 
acquisition to the Competition Commission.161 OFT determined that Instagram 
was a current competitor in social networking services, and that Facebook’s 
large share of the market achieved the threshold for investigation.162 OFT 
interpreted Instagram’s rapid growth as an indication of low barriers to entry in 
social networking and photo sharing, concluding that Instagram did not evince 
a uniquely competitive product such that its acquisition would foreclose 
competition in either market.163 OFT considered Instagram as a potential 
competitor in digital advertising markets, but determined that Facebook’s 
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Id. (citations omitted).  
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competition from Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft dwarfed the potential 
competitive impact of entry by Instagram. It determined that there was “no 
realistic prospect that the merger may result in a substantial lessening of 
competition in the supply of display advertising.”164  
Today, Facebook claims a dominant position in the social networking and 
online social photo services markets, and market power through the Facebook-
Google duopoly over digital advertising. If the antitrust agencies faltered, it was 
likely because the potential competition doctrine created difficult obstacles for 
a merger challenge. Consider the following facts of the Instagram merger in light 
of the required proof under the 1984 Merger Guidelines to justify a Department 
of Justice challenge.  
1.  Market Concentration 
The 1984 Merger Guidelines state that a challenge is unlikely if 
concentration in the acquired firm’s market is below 1800 HHI.165 In the case of 
the Instagram merger, the relevant market to measure concentration would be 
the acquiring firm’s market. Facebook operates in markets for social networking 
and digital advertising. By 2011, Facebook dominated the social networking 
industry by a wide margin in terms of user numbers and engagement, but HHI 
calculations lack defined measures for markets where the user price is zero.166 
A workable measure of concentration is critical for markets like social 
networking in which the good or service is free. As zero-price markets 
proliferate, antitrust institutions must adopt new instruments for analysis or risk 
the amplification of consumer harms.167 Scholarship on the application of 
antitrust in these markets suggests that enforcement focus on attention and 
informational costs or metrics such as “time on site” to indicate the extent of 
competition for user engagement.168 Such a measure could have demonstrated 
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 166. See HAMPTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 13.  
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for attention and time on site is readily measurable, and already tracked by both industry and 
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minutes of the average American’s time, as compared with about 250 for Instagram and Snap, 
respectively, and less than 200 for Twitter, and 50 for Google+. Relying on these data for 
hypothetical purposes . . . if consumers nationwide spent a total of some 2000 minutes per week on 
all social networking apps, and overall spent 55 percent of those hours on Facebook and 12.5 percent 
on Instagram, we would have some sense of the structural importance of a transaction like the 
Facebook/Instagram combination. 
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important implications of a Facebook-Instagram merger for competition in the 
market.  
In the digital advertising market, the Facebook-Google duopoly already 
controlled 45.5% of revenue in 2011, although the majority of that share was 
attributable to Google.169 Narrowing the scope to the display advertising market, 
the top six firms in 2011 collected approximately 49% of the digital display 
advertising revenue and the HHI among those six firms amounted to just 546.170 
In the years following the 2012 acquisition of Instagram, the Facebook-Google 
duopoly consolidated their market power in both the digital advertising and the 
display advertising markets. By 2018, both markets displayed HHIs of over 1800 
and Facebook’s share of display advertising revenue in the U.S. market rose to 
more than 20%—even higher if a more narrow market were defined.171 Thus, 
while it is likely that a measure of concentration for the social networking market 
would have satisfied the first prong of the merger guidelines analysis, the 
concentration levels measured for the display advertising market concentration 
levels would not have been sufficient. 
2.  Conditions of Entry Generally 
The Department of Justice will not challenge a potential competition 
merger if entry into the market is easy.172 This protocol requires the Department 
of Justice to demonstrate some difficulty of entry or barriers to entry in the 
concentrated market. Through 2011, the markets for social networking and 
digital advertising had been dynamic as firms in these markets competed for 
dominance. The economies of scale and network effects that typify platform 
markets represent traditional barriers to entry that would reinforce the 
incumbency of dominant firms,173 but Instagram was showing the potential for 
a nascent competitor to siphon off users and gain market share. Entry into social 
networking or digital advertising markets was achievable for small and startup 
firms that operated in any of several adjacent markets if they exhibited the rapid 
growth in user engagement that would lead to increasing value on both sides of 
 
Wu, supra note 149, at 794 (footnotes omitted). 
 169. EMARKETER, BEYOND THE DUOPOLY: EXPLORING DIGITAL ADVERTISING OUTSIDE GOOGLE AND 
FACEBOOK (2017), https://www.emarketer.com/Report/Beyond-Duopoly-Exploring-Digital-Advertising-
Outside-Google-Facebook/2002174. 
 170. Google, Facebook Continue to Lead in Digital Display Earnings, supra note 157 (adding together the 
percentages of total display ad revenues from 2011 for the six firms). The Authors calculated the HHI from the 
information given in the table. Each firm's market share was calculated with firm revenues divided by total 
digital display revenues. Then the HHI calculated as the sum of the squared market shares for the listed firms. 
The data is on file with the Authors.  
 171. US Digital Ad Spending Will Surpass Traditional in 2019, supra note 151; Marvin, supra note 155.  
 172. See Brodley, supra note 92, at 388. 
 173. See Newman, supra note 148, at 1514. 
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the market and if they had access to the funding that would allow the company 
to scale up.174  
There is one significant barrier to entry in online platform markets that is 
unlike the traditional barriers considered in other markets: access to data.175 A 
dominant firm with access to broad user data has a significant advantage over 
new entrants. The data advantage allows a dominant firm to reinforce its market 
power in three ways. The firm can use data to review and improve user services 
in the core market and expand user engagement, generating more data. The firm 
can leverage its data advantage to reach new users through entry into adjacent 
markets and likewise expand its data access. Finally, the scope and magnitude 
of consumer data available to a dominant firm allows it to sell high-value, 
targeted advertising with revenues that may be invested in increasing user 
engagement and amassing more consumer data. These three advantages create a 
positive feedback loop for the dominant firm.176  
The drive to exploit user attention and access to data may translate to gains 
for consumers who enjoy higher quality services and seemingly individuated 
advertising. For startups with comparatively little data access, the competitive 
advantage of large firms’ data scale and efficiencies poses a significant barrier 
to entry. As a result of these advantages, the dominant, consumer-facing 
platforms also dominate advertising markets—a tendency exemplified in the 
Facebook-Google duopoly.  
Despite these structural barriers, demonstrating the difficulty of entry into 
the social networking or digital advertising markets presents a challenge. For 
one thing, the data barrier is specific to online platform markets. For another, 
competition for user attention forces the dominant firm to compete with 
platforms and applications operating across a variety of markets. There is no 
direct substitute for Facebook in the social networking market, but smaller firms 
offering complementary or adjacent features have the ability to capture user 
attention that draws engagement and profits away from the network, even if the 
smaller firm is not competing in social networking.177 This ability to capture user 
attention also makes these smaller, adjacent firms potential competitors in digital 
advertising. Extending consideration to potential competitors in adjacent 
markets where entry is relatively easy could undermine the government’s ability 
to isolate any impact from the elimination of a single rival.  
 
 174. See ROB MAHINI, AM. ANITITRUST INST., GETTING IT RIGHT: MARKET DEFINITION IN THE 
TECHNOLOGY SECTOR 2–3 (2020), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Mahini.pdf. 
 175. FURMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 33.  
 176. Id. at 34. 
 177. During a 2018 congressional hearing, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg responded to the question 
“[w]ho is your biggest competitor?” by insisting that the company competes in three main categories, rather than 
facing a direct competitor in one primary market. Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of 
Data: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., 115th Cong. 
29–30 (2018) (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham). Zuckerberg also mentioned that a typical American uses 
eight different communications software applications but did not mention that Facebook owns several of them. 
Id. 
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3.  The Target Firm’s Entry Advantage 
If entry is not easy generally, then the Department of Justice has to show 
that Instagram had an entry advantage not possessed by three or more firms. For 
reasons discussed later, the potential for firms to enter social networking or 
digital advertising markets from a variety of adjacent or complementary markets 
makes it impossible to identify limits to potential entrants. Isolating the photo 
sharing market in the case of Instagram provides a good example of this 
difficulty.  
Despite Facebook’s dominance in photo sharing, several desktop-based 
and mobile applications existed at the time. Most of these platforms lacked the 
social features that distinguished the social networking elements available 
through Facebook and Instagram. Facebook even purchased several other photo-
related services leading up to the Instagram acquisition, including the photo 
sharing and tagging website Divvyshot in April 2010, the file sharing, 
messaging, and commenting service Drop.io in October 2010, and video and 
image recording and editing app developer Digital Staircase in November 
2011.178 In May 2012, after announcing the Instagram acquisition but before it 
was finalized, Facebook purchased Lightbox.com, a mobile social photo sharing 
application designed for Android, in the period before Instagram introduced its 
Android app.179 While Lightbox had amassed 1.5 million downloads in its first 
seven months of operation, Instagram’s Android launch in April reached 1 
million within a week.180 Facebook purchased and shuttered the Lightbox 
application, absorbing its employees and pulling the app from the market 
immediately.181 Facebook launched its own camera app, Facebook Camera, on 
May 24, 2012, weeks after announcing its intention to acquire Instagram.182 
The United Kingdom’s OFT decision lists six competing apps in the photo 
sharing market, including Camera Awesome, Camera +, Flickr, Hipstamatic, 
Path, and Pixable.183 Of these services, only Camera+, Hipstamatic, and Camera 
Awesome included camera applications. Flickr is a photo storage and 
management tool and Pixable was an aggregator that scraped images from social 
networks including Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.184 Path was a social 
network conceived as a competitor to Facebook that offered a more private 
experience, limiting social connections to invite more personal interactions.185 
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 184. Chris Anderson, Pixable Closing Up Shop After One Crazy, Awesome Ride, MEDIUM (Nov. 30, 2015), 
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Hipstamatic and Camera+ provided photo taking and editing tools but lacked the 
social features that distinguished Instagram.186 In addition, Hipstamatic and 
Camera Awesome had entered into a partnership with Instagram that streamlined 
posting photos taken with those apps to Instagram’s social network.187 The 
OFT’s list of competitors illustrates the difficulty of identifying potential 
entrants in the social networking or digital advertising markets. In online 
platform markets, new entrants often offer just a subset of the services offered 
by the dominant provider.188 Firms like Instagram that gain the popularity and 
funding to scale become rivals for user attention and potentially rivals for the 
market over time. Facebook would likely argue that Instagram is just one of 
many potential entrants into social networking, and that any of the other photo 
sharing apps could replace the potential competition lost through the Instagram 
acquisition. Moreover, when consumers multi-home by using several apps at 
once, entry by multiple firms becomes even more likely.  
Facebook named Instagram as an important competitor, but it was not the 
only competitor. Instagram’s entry advantages were the extraordinary user 
growth rate and venture capital investments that might allow the firm to 
overcome barriers of scale and data access in the social networking and digital 
advertising markets. These same advantages gained the attention of Facebook 
and its buyout proposal.  
4.  Deconcentration from Instagram Entry 
The final criteria for a potential competition claim is for the government to 
show that Instagram’s entry into the social networking or advertising markets 
would deconcentrate the market or have a significant procompetitive effect. 
Under the Merger Guidelines, this effect can be established by showing that 
Instagram had a market share of 5% or more.189 In 2012, the first year Instagram 
was included in the Pew Social Media Survey, 12% of adults—and a 
significantly higher share of young people—used Instagram despite the fact that 
it was a mobile-only application.190 There are no attentional measures such as 
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time on site available for the period before acquisition, but multi-homing and 
Instagram’s own interoperability would suggest that the company claimed a 
small share of total social networking users’ attention. The market draw for 
Instagram was its popularity with important demographic groups at a time when 
Facebook saw reaching young people and their preferred technologies as key to 
maintaining dominance in the market.191 
At the time of the Facebook acquisition, Instagram had not entered the 
digital advertising market and had no advertising revenue.192 It would be 
impossible to establish a procompetitive effect of Instagram’s entry into the 
advertising market through the 5% threshold because competition from 
Instagram lay entirely in the future.  
The potential competition challenge by the Department of Justice would 
have certainly failed under its own guidelines. But consider the post-acquisition 
information that retrospectively demonstrates how the guidelines produce a false 
negative result. Since the acquisition was finalized in 2012, Instagram has 
generated a significant share of user engagement and revenue for Facebook. 
With Facebook’s resources and expertise guiding its evolution, Instagram 
reached 1 billion monthly active users in June 2018 even as Facebook’s own 
user growth dwindled.193 According to the Pew Research Center, Instagram 
trails Facebook as the third-most popular social network in the United States 
with 37% of adults using the platform in 2019.194 It is the most-used social 
network for American teens.195 Although Facebook does not disclose 
Instagram’s financial details, market analysts estimate that 15% of Facebook’s 
revenues come from advertising on Instagram, a number expected to grow over 
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time.196 In 2019, Instagram launched a checkout feature allowing users to make 
purchases from within the app and delivering a new source of revenue to its 
parent company.197 It is impossible to know if Instagram would have developed 
into such a powerful position without Facebook’s guidance, but it is clear that 
Facebook’s ownership of Instagram allows it to reach a larger user base and 
achieve greater levels of user engagement and revenue generation than Facebook 
alone. The economies of scale and scope that characterize online platform 
markets are simultaneously a source of efficiency gains from the acquisition of 
Instagram and a barrier to entry reinforcing Facebook’s dominance in the social 
networking market.  
The Instagram case shows that the potential competition doctrine must be 
reformed. Common sense suggests that concentration must be measured either 
by an alternative metric in markets where goods are offered to the public without 
charge, such as user engagement, or possibly by the advertising dollars that flow 
to social networks. As we will discuss in the last Part of this Article, 
concentration should serve as a structural rebuttable presumption when a 
dominant firm purchases a potential entrant. Before turning to that issue, we 
briefly discuss Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp. 
B.  THE WHATSAPP ACQUISITION 
Facebook’s $19 billion acquisition of WhatsApp was another landmark 
deal. In 2014, mobile messaging applications were the fastest growing app 
category in the mobile market as social media evolved to accommodate 
increasing smartphone usage.198 Users relied on these applications for far more 
than text messaging, with a variety of social activities taking place on the apps 
including voice calling, image and video sharing, and gaming.199 Five-year-old 
WhatsApp was already the largest and fastest growing of these applications 
worldwide. The app offered a reliable and affordable cross-platform technology 
for text, voice, image, and video sharing in one-to-one or group contexts that 
worked across national borders complete with end-to-end encryption. At the 
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time of the acquisition, WhatsApp had 450 million monthly active users and was 
gaining users at a record rate of one million per day.200 Importantly, WhatsApp 
users were unusually engaged; more than 70% of WhatsApp users accessed the 
app daily and its volume of messaging rivaled the global total of telecom 
SMS.201  
Two characteristics distinguished WhatsApp from its rival messaging 
services, and from Facebook’s corporate model. First, WhatsApp’s founders 
committed the service to almost complete data privacy.202 Second, WhatsApp 
was advertising-free.203 Instead of the intensive data collection, aggregation, and 
analysis driving advertising revenue on other apps and networks, the company 
elected a paid model with most users charged a $0.99 annual subscription fee 
after their first year of service.204 The app offered an alternative entry point into 
scaled-down social networking using only existing phone contacts to connect 
users; it was more personalized and lacked the privacy concerns and tracking 
characteristic of Facebook. 
In February 2014 when Facebook and WhatsApp announced their merger, 
Facebook served over 1.2 billion monthly active users. Mobile devices had 
become an essential component of that usership. More than 75% of active users 
accessed the network through mobile technology and in the fourth quarter of 
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2013 mobile Facebook users outnumbered those using personal computers for 
the first time in the company’s history.205 Growth in user engagement was 
increasingly driven by mobile access to the social network and Facebook 
anticipated that future growth would similarly depend on mobile connections.206 
In its 2013 Annual Report, Facebook identified mobile applications with 
competing social features including text messaging, voice, image, and video 
sharing as a key source of competition for the network.207  
Facebook’s reorientation toward mobile-first engagement led the company 
to develop and release its own standalone messaging app, Facebook Messenger. 
As mobile users sought short, private, and real-time communication options, 
Facebook identified and acquired one of the best-received startups in the mobile 
messaging market, Beluga, and refashioned it into a Facebook product.208 Upon 
its release in August 2011, Messenger became the number one most-downloaded 
app on the Apple store overnight.209 Although Messenger quickly claimed the 
status of the most-utilized iPhone messaging application in the United States, 
Facebook struggled to make headway in markets like Europe where early 
movers had an established advantage and in emerging markets where consumers 
were more likely to access their networks through feature phones.210 In early 
2014, when Facebook and WhatsApp agreed on their merger, Facebook 
Messenger had 200 million users compared to WhatsApp’s 450 million.211 With 
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the purchase of WhatsApp, Facebook would claim ownership of the world’s top 
two messaging companies in terms of market share by user numbers.212  
The $19 billion price tag made the WhatsApp acquisition one of the largest 
mergers in Silicon Valley history.213 Facebook’s offer nearly doubled a prior bid 
from Google to buy the startup for $10 billion.214 Moreover, the $19 billion deal 
amounted to approximately one-tenth of Facebook’s total market value, while 
the monetization opportunities associated with WhatsApp were as yet 
unproven.215 In 2013, WhatsApp operated at a $138 million loss.216 WhatsApp’s 
commitment to maintain privacy precluded merging its users with Facebook’s 
social graph and adding advertising or other monetization options would require 
a substantial change in WhatsApp’s approach to the messaging market. For 
Facebook, the benefits of owning WhatsApp clearly involved future competitive 
advantages in messaging and social media. Firstly, the purchase thwarted rival 
Google’s attempt to gain ground as a social network. Secondly, the transition 
from social sharing on broad networks to one-to-one and group messages 
promoting private, real-time interactions indicated a significant shift in the social 
networking services market. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg increasingly 
alluded to this shift as an important guide for advancing social networking and 
other social media with his declaration that “the future is private.”217 
True to form, the FTC cleared the merger without challenge in April of 
2014, with a letter warning both companies about their responsibility to maintain 
the privacy agreements in place when WhatsApp users accepted the company’s 
terms of service.218 The letter highlights the distinction between Facebook’s data 
collection and advertising platform model and WhatsApp’s promises that it will 
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not collect any personal or contact data from mobile phones or messages or send 
any marketing material without the user’s consent.219  
The European Commission also conducted an investigation of the 
transaction and cleared the deal.220 The European Union (EU) primarily 
analyzed the merger within the confines of the relevant market for consumer 
communications services, not as a potential competition merger. Consumer 
communication services includes stand-alone apps such as WhatsApp, Viber, 
Line, WeChat, Facebook Messenger, Skype, and those integrated with 
smartphone hardware or operating systems like Apple’s iMessage. In their 
analysis of consumer communications services, the Commission noted that low 
switching costs, the tendency for users to multi-home, and the overlap between 
consumers of the two platforms would undermine any barriers to entry derived 
from the network effects captured by the merged companies. On these grounds, 
they concluded that the merger would be unlikely to lead to increased 
concentration in consumer communications services.221  
The Commission ultimately found no competitive concerns in the online 
advertising services market, based on WhatsApp’s abstention from advertising 
and data collection and the number of providers supplying online advertising at 
the time.222 The EU also analyzed the social networking market and again found 
no competitive concerns.223 According to the EU analysis, WhatsApp was not a 
participant in the social networking market. The Commission considered a social 
network to involve many functions in addition to communications, including 
contact lists, user profiles, relationship status, and other social features of online 
activity.224 Although the EU reported that several industry participants informed 
the Commission that they considered WhatsApp to be a social network already, 
and predicted that absent the merger WhatsApp would expand and scale in this 
market, the Commission dismissed these opinions.225 The EU placed 
considerable weight on statements from WhatsApp management, stating “[n]o 
indication was found of WhatsApp’s plans to become a social network [as 
defined by the EU] which would compete with Facebook absent the merger.”226 
In the Commission’s view, identifying WhatsApp as a potential competitor in 
social networking would expand the scope of alternative sources of competition 
to include other prominent firms in the consumer communications market, 
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including LINE, WeChat, iMessage, Skype, Snapchat, Viber, and Hangouts. 
Such an expansion would only make it less likely that the elimination of a single 
rival would raise competitive concerns.227  
Next, the Commission evaluated the potential for Facebook to gain market 
power in social networking by integrating the two platforms. The addition of 
WhatsApp’s consumer base to Facebook’s social graph would reinforce the 
network effects that maintained Facebook’s dominance in the market for social 
networking services. According to the Commission’s report and later 
documents, Facebook testified that technical limitations would prevent any such 
integration without significant user involvement.228 The claims that technical 
issues prevented integration were proven false just two years later in 2016 when 
Facebook began to add WhatsApp user data to the Facebook social graph.229 The 
EU fined Facebook €110 million ($122 million) for misleading the Commission 
but did not reverse its authorization of the acquisition.230  
What the EU did not consider was the possibility that the social networking 
market could be disrupted by a mobile, reliable, private, no-frills competitor. 
While the Commission noted that innovation in communications services was 
driven by consumer demand for reliability, privacy, and security, and 
acknowledged that the social networking services and consumer 
communications services markets exhibited significant overlap,231 it did not 
identify the trends in consumer behavior pointing toward the increasing the 
importance of private, mobile social platforms. Facebook had honed in on the 
competitive threat that this shift in consumer preferences presented for social 
networking, especially as it manifested in demographic and geographic groups 
critical to user growth such as young mobile users and those in emerging 
markets.  
WhatsApp may have posed important potential competition issues. The 
strength of its reliable private messaging capabilities, its social orientation 
connecting users through their address books, its access to unique user data, and 
its ability to scale untethered to a monetization strategy based on consumer 
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surveillance could have raised a threat to Facebook’s social network strategy. 
WhatsApp also may have been able to partner with complementary service 
providers to generate revenue and develop innovative and competitive social 
communications products. We will never know.  
The EU’s analysis highlights the problems with the potential competition 
doctrine. First, the problems of evaluating concentration in the social networking 
and mobile messaging markets are identical to those pertaining to the acquisition 
of Instagram: enforcement agencies have yet to identify a workable measure of 
concentration or a credible data source. The European Commission’s report 
notes the lack of appropriate measure, despite its own reliance on user numbers 
(provided by Facebook) as a proxy for market shares.232 Second, the perceived 
ease of entry and broad consideration of potential competitors ignores the data 
barrier that reinforces firm dominance in online platform markets and makes it 
difficult for the government to isolate the impact of eliminating individual rival 
companies. Finally, according to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, a five 
percent market share would substantiate the potential for WhatsApp to have 
significant procompetitive effects in markets for social networking or digital 
advertising.233 The EU cites conflicting views on the distinct boundaries of 
social networking markets, but even if these boundaries were clear, proof of 
deconcentration still demands appropriate measures of market share and current 
participation in the market.234 Harm to potential future competition was alone 
inadequate to challenge the merger. 
The high initial burden on the plaintiff to present a case concerning future 
conduct and competitive effects serves as a serious deterrent to potential 
competition mergers, even by dominant firms. Under a simply structural 
presumption the FTC could have elected to challenge the merger and shifted the 
burden to Facebook to demonstrate why no harm to future competition could 
occur, and why, given Facebook’s resources it could not internally innovate to 
achieve its competitive goals. A structural standard of this type should be 
embraced by critics of agency intervention who believe that the government is 
poorly positioned to make a strong empirical case, since representatives of the 
private sector would be the first source of analysis.  
 
 232. Id. § 5.1.3.1, para. 97. According to the Commission, the Onavo data presented numerous shortcomings 
and alternative data are not available:  
  The Commission notes that the market shares indicated above are likely to underestimate the 
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 234. See id. § 4.2.2.2, para. 52. 
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IV.  REFORM OF THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE 
The Instagram and WhatsApp examples demonstrate how the potential 
competition doctrine is designed to fail by placing an unrealistic burden on the 
government in a challenge to any of the hundreds of mergers by dominant 
technology firms. We do not think this case is merely the result of new 
technology that has rendered the law obsolete and unworkable. We argue that 
the law was made unworkable because of the ideological goals of the Chicago 
School of Economics.  
A comparison of the law of horizontal mergers with potential competition 
mergers is instructive. The Philadelphia National Bank structural presumption 
remains intact today.235 The plaintiff, typically the government, bears the initial 
burden in a § 7 horizontal merger case of demonstrating that the challenged 
merger should be presumed to substantially harm competition. This is 
accomplished by showing that the transaction will lead to undue 
concentration.236 The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the 
presumption. If successful, the burden then shifts back to the government to 
present additional evidence of competitive harm. The structural presumption has 
survived despite erosion by the lower courts. For example, in United States v. 
Baker Hughes, Inc., Justice Thomas (then on the D.C. Circuit) sought to dilute 
the presumption stating: 
The Supreme Court has adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to 
the statute, weighing a variety of factors to determine the effects of particular 
transactions on competition. That the government can establish a prima facie 
case through evidence on only one factor, market concentration, does not 
negate the breadth of this analysis.237 
In contrast to the courts, when the Reagan Administration appointees to the 
Department of Justice revised the Merger Guidelines in 1982 they replaced the 
strong structural presumption in the 1968 Guidelines with a detailed multi-step 
effects approach that placed the full burden of demonstrating a merger will harm 
competition on the government itself.238 The shift was motivated by the Chicago 
School supposition that most mergers are efficiency producing, an assumption 
that was never backed by empirical evidence.239 The higher burden made it much 
less likely that the antitrust agencies would bring a merger challenge, and when 
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they did, defendants could point to any defects in the agency’s proof induced by 
its own standards.240 
The shift away from the Philadelphia Bank structural presumption for 
mergers that impact potential competition came earlier. It was achieved in 
complete form in Justice Powell’s opinion in United States v. Marine 
Bancorporation.241 This wrong turn in 1974 must be corrected in order for the 
potential competition doctrine to have any practical application in tech markets.  
Thus, the starting point for our approach would be to resurrect the pre-
Marine Bancorporation 1968 Merger Guidelines. Under the 1968 Merger 
Guidelines, a merger would be likely to be challenged when a firm with a large 
market share (above 25%) purchases a firm that is “one of the most likely 
entrants into the market.”242 The determination of whether a firm is a likely 
entrant is based on the capacity of the firm to enter, an incentive to enter based 
on attractiveness or a special relationship of the market, and potential 
profitability of entry, or a manifested interest in entry. While a possible starting 
point, a further correction is required. The 1968 Guidelines’ analysis of entry is 
open ended and not sufficiently amenable to a tractable structural presumption 
that could be used by the courts.  
What is needed to address the intractability of proof in a potential 
competition merger is a reasonable proxy that can incorporate a structural 
presumption for the likely entry or entry advantage of the startup. Thus, the 
second component of our test is to adopt the proxy that Professor Joe Brodley 
referred to as a “legal surrogate to identify the entry advantage of the acquiring 
firm.”243 Professor Brodley recommended the use of the concept of “proximate 
markets” to provide the structural presumption of ability to enter and entry 
advantage for a target firm. As Professor Brodley explained: 
  Market proximity is a concept of presumptive entry advantage. Two 
markets are proximate to the extent that a knowledgeable firm in one market 
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possesses the necessary production and marketing information and other 
capabilities to operate in the other. Market proximity provides a suitable 
surrogate for entry advantage because, other factors being equal, there is less 
risk and therefore less expense involved in entering a familiar market.244 
To establish proximity, Professor Brodley focused on the factors that 
would be critical to the entry analysis of a business: production, marketing, 
technology, and customer relations similarities.245 More pointed criteria can be 
defined given the accumulated knowledge concerning tech industry mergers. 
For example, proximity to the general search market in which Google is 
dominant would include factors such as specialized search features, search 
advertising abilities, and the overlap of users with Google properties. The 
criteria would capture a vertical shopping site that is supported by search 
advertising and would clearly be a proximate market to the general search 
market. There are many such vertical markets that are potential rivals to 
Google’s general search advertising revenues. Proximate markets to the social 
networking market certainly would include markets that compete with the 
functions hosted by Facebook’s social network for user engagement and/or 
compete for similar targeted advertising dollars. In addition, the ability to gather 
user data complementary to Facebook’s may be indicia of proximity.  
We pause to recognize that other scholars have proposed different tests. 
We argue here that these tests do not create a sufficient standard for potential 
competition cases, and would condemn the plaintiffs in such cases to 
unworkable standards.  
To start, Professor John Kwoka proposed a test246 involving two 
components, one involving structure and one involving effect: “(1) satisfaction 
of one structural precondition for concern with mergers involving non-
incumbent firms, and then (2) demonstration of certain features specific to the 
case of (a) a deconstraining merger or (b) an entry-negating merger.”247 
 The first step, demonstration of a structural precondition, requires that there 
be moderate concentration according to the 1992 Guidelines approach.248 Under 
recent guidelines, the standard for moderate concentration is substantially 
increased.249 Regardless, substantial concentration is a condition for bringing 
any merger challenge. Over-reliance on the guidelines (in any version) will 
effectively eliminate a potential competition claim and analysis we seek to bring. 
 Under Professor Kwoka’s test, if the structural precondition holds, then the 
analysis hinges upon whether the merger is entry-negating or deconstraining.250 
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If the merger is deconstraining, the transaction “would likely be challenged on 
the basis of convincing evidence that the firm represented an effective and 
significant constraint on competition among incumbents.”251 Such “convincing 
evidence” would include “documents in the possession of incumbent firms 
indicating active monitoring of and reaction to the non-incumbent party to the 
merger” or “market data that demonstrate significant responsiveness by 
incumbents to actions of the allegedly constraining firm.”252  
 With respect to an entry-negating merger, Professor Kwoka would have the 
enforcement agencies challenge such transactions if the transaction meets a 
multi-factored analysis.253 These factors are all focused on intent and ability to 
enter.254 
 One of the authors of this Article, along with Salvatore Massa,255 
proposed a two-step approach for a party moving to show entry with an 
opportunity for the non-moving party to rebut the claim. In that article, the first 
step is to determine whether the firm intends to and has the ability to enter the 
market.256 Evidence that directly relates to the commitments and investments a 
firm has made for entry are the most direct and relevant.257 The difficulty with 
this test is that if the evidence is more equivocal, there is little guidance as to 
how to proceed—a point admitted to in the original article.258 
 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 199. Professor Kwoka’s test requires that: 
(1) The non-incumbent competitor has the capability to enter within a period of two years. 
(2) The non-incumbent competitor would likely find entry profitable if price were to remain at its 
present level (or rise by some predictable amount). 
(3) The non-incumbent competitor could enter at a scale sufficient to reduce price by a small but 
significant and nontransitory amount (or hold it constant if it otherwise would rise by at least a small 
but significant amount), or could enter at a smaller initial scale but with the capability and incentive 
to expand substantially within a period of two years. 
(4) The non-incumbent competitor is one of no more than five equally well-positioned prospective 
entrants, or is significantly better positioned to enter than any other possible entrant.  
Id. As noted earlier, in the presence of many equally well-positioned non-incumbents, the elimination of a 
single one would arguably not affect future market performance. Presumably, although it is not explicit, 
all of these conditions must hold simultaneously for there to be a problem under Professor Kwoka’s 
analysis. 
 254. See id. at 199–200. 
 255. See Bush & Massa, supra note 50.  
 256. Id. at 1143. 
 257.  
Sunk cost investments for entry, customer contracts, bids, entry plans, and other firm documents, 
such as e-mails, memos, or consultant reports discussing entry, are all strong evidence of entry. In 
the strong cases—where there is a reasonable probability that a firm will enter a market—there is no 
need to move to the second step, because the moving party has met its burden of showing entry. At 
the other extreme, if there is no internal evidence that shows the firm was contemplating entry, or 
the evidence shows it rejected entry well before the conduct at issue in the case, then the moving 
party has failed to meet its burden and there is no need to move to the second step. 
Id.  
 258.  
February 2021] BIG TECH’S BUYING SPREE 509 
The second step considered other factors that may influence the relevance 
of potential entry.259 The primary issue is whether the potential entrant firm has 
an ongoing influence on the market. To make this determination, the court may 
turn to external factors, such as general industry knowledge and the internal 
documents of competitors, to see if there is a perception that the firm is a 
potential entry threat. Econometric evidence that a potential competitor is 
constraining prices in the market is the strongest evidence. Where econometric 
evidence is ambiguous, courts could look to other evidence.260 Regardless, the 
party not asserting potential competition would have the ability to rebut the 
potential competition claim to demonstrate that the firm would not be able to 
discipline the market, have too remote an entry date, is unfit to enter the market, 
or is not unique in its ability to enter.261 
There are multiple problems with this approach. Most pressing apart from 
the test’s complication, however, is that the ability to rebut will likely swallow 
the claim. In particular, uniqueness would likely be difficult to argue against.  
Others have argued that the potential competition doctrine is “superfluous,” 
and could be integrated into the recent Horizontal Merger Guidelines.262 The 
authors argue that the potential competition doctrine, whether actual or potential, 
is a meaningless distinction: “Whichever label is applied, the theory must 
involve a unilateral or coordinated horizontal effect, and its evaluation should 
be essentially the same. The new Horizontal Merger Guidelines are consistent 
with this approach.”263  
 
  The more difficult case to show potential entry is one where the evidence is more equivocal and 
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Id. at 1143–44. 
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We consider this a weird flex. For one, it is not as if there have been a 
plethora of potential competition cases under any version of the Guidelines. To 
the extent that the Non-Horizontal Merger guidelines raised issues inconsistent 
with consumer welfare, those Guidelines have been disavowed.264 Moreover, 
even the Department of Justice has not consistently adopted a guidelines 
approach when seeking to prove potential competition, particularly outside of 
the area of § 7.265 Even within the realm of § 7, the Guidelines approach has 
proven problematic, and any rebranding of the Guidelines is unlikely to cure the 
issues we describe here.266 In short, neither Instagram nor WhatsApp would have 
been challenged successfully under any of these tests. 
Under our approach, both the Instagram and the WhatsApp mergers might 
have been challenged. Instagram operated in a proximate market. In the months 
before the Instagram acquisition, Facebook identified photo sharing as a key 
component of social network functionality, particularly on the mobile platform, 
and a key facet of Facebook’s own success.267 The social features common to 
Facebook and Instagram demonstrate considerable proximity between the two 
companies. The private messaging offered by WhatsApp was rapidly becoming 
a prevailing aspect of online communication for individuals and groups, with 
networks established via the user’s own address book posing an alternative to 
the public platform approach. In both cases, users’ increasing reliance on mobile 
technology for digital interactions forced a collision between Facebook and the 
proximate markets that provided the aspects of online interaction its users 
increasingly demanded. Under the structural approach, tech mergers like 
Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp could be challenged and 
receive the scrutiny they deserve. Regardless of the particular cases engaged, the 
process would develop a new guide to judicial decision making in tech markets.  
We advocate the informed development of a fully structural presumption 
for potential competition mergers in technology markets. We think that this is 
how the law of potential competition mergers should have developed after the 
Philadelphia Bank case but was derailed by United States v. Marine 
Bancorporation.  
 
 264. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL II-24 (5th ed. 2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
file/761166/download  (“The NonHorizontal Merger Guidelines from Section 4 of the 1984 Merger Guidelines 
remain in effect for nonhorizontal mergers (i.e., vertical mergers; mergers that eliminate potential 
competitors), although they do not describe the full range of potential anti-competitive effects of nonhorizontal 
mergers.”). 
 265. See, e.g., United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 266. For other difficulties with more recent versions of the Guidelines, see Bush & Massa, supra note 50, 
at 1080–91. 
 267. MG Siegler, Zuckerberg: Facebook Photos Used 5 or 6 Times More Than Competitors—Combined, 
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 27, 2010, 7:10 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2010/08/27/facebook-photos-usage/. 
February 2021] BIG TECH’S BUYING SPREE 511 
CONCLUSION 
Big Tech has demonstrated that it has an insatiable appetite for acquisitions 
of small startups. The sheer number of acquisitions should raise red flags for the 
antitrust agencies. After many hundreds of such acquisitions, so few challenges 
or requests to fully investigate these acquisitions demands some explanation. 
We argue that one aspect of the problem is that the law of potential competition 
has developed in a manner that essentially ties the hands of the antitrust agencies 
because it demands levels of proof that are intractable, particularly for a court.  
We have arrived at this point because of the widespread acceptance of the 
Chicago School’s approach to mergers. The Chicago School asserted that only 
mergers to monopoly were a legitimate antitrust concern, and that mergers that 
do not result in monopoly are usually efficiency increasing and undertaken for 
that purpose.268 With these background presumptions, the Chicago School 
advocates jettisoned the structural approach to mergers and replaced it with an 
effects analysis that raised the burden to merger challenges and provided defense 
counsel with multiple avenues to attack a government challenge.  
The efficacy of the potential competition doctrine fell to the same unsound 
premises beginning in 1974 in United States v. Bancorporation. The doctrine 
now embraces difficult tests of conduct and performance. In markets where 
tipping occurs, technology is rapidly changing, and startup firms can scale and 
challenge dominant incumbents, a viable potential competition law is critical to 
protect competition and consumers. What is needed is to untie the hands of 
government antitrust enforcers by articulating a clear structural test to identify 
acquisitions of potential competition. To achieve this standard, we contend that 
very little innovation in law or in economics is necessary. We need only reverse 
the damage brought by the Chicago School and its neoliberal revolution and 
return to the potential competition doctrine of the 1968 Merger Guidelines.  
  
 
 268. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984); see ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 221 (1978). 
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07/19/2007 07/19/2007 undisclosed Parakey 2005 Platform 
06/23/2008 06/23/2008 $31 millionᵈ Connect U 2004 
Social 
Networking 
08/10/2009 08/10/2008 $47.5 millionᵈ Friend Feed 2007 
Social 
Networking 
02/01/2010 02/19/2010 undisclosed Octazen 2006 Data & Analytics 
04/03/2010 03/02/2010 undisclosed Divvyshot 2009 Media sharing 
05/13/2010 05/13/2010 40000000ᵈ Friendster (patents) 2001 
Social 
Networking 
05/26/2010 05/26/2010 undisclosed ShareGrove 2008 Messaging 
07/08/2010 07/08/2010 $2.5 millionᶜ Nextstop 2009 
Location 
services 
08/15/2010 08/15/2010 $10 millionᵇᶜ Chai Labs 2007 
Location 
services 
08/20/2010 08/20/2010 $10 millionᶜ Hot Potato 2009 
Location 
services 
10/29/2010 10/29/2010 $10 millionᵈ Drop.io 2007 
Media 
sharing 
11/16/2010 11/16/2010 undisclosed Walletin 2010 Gaming 
11/16/2010 11/16/2010 undisclosed Zenbe 2006 Messaging 
01/25/2011 01/25/2011 undisclosed Rel8tion 2010 Advertising 
03/01/2011 03/02/2011 undisclosed Beluga 2010 Messaging 
03/20/2011 03/20/2011 $70 millionᵇᶜ Snaptu 2007 Platform 
03/24/2011 03/24/2011 undisclosed Recrec 2010 Platform 
04/27/2011 04/27/2011 undisclosed Datum 2011 Data & Analytics 
06/09/2011 06/09/2011 undisclosed Sofa 2006 Design 
08/02/2011 08/02/2011 undisclosed Push Pop Press 2010 E-Publishing 
10/11/2011 10/10/2011 undisclosed Friend.ly 2010 Data & Analytics 
11/08/2011 11/08/2011 undisclosed Strobe 2011 Developer Tools 
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11/08/2011  undisclosed Digital Staircase 2008 Media sharing 
11/15/2011 11/15/2011 undisclosed MailRank 2010 Messaging 
11/23/2011  undisclosed WhoGlue 2000 Messaging 
12/02/2011 12/02/2011 3000000ᶜ Gowalla 2007 Location services 
02/12/2012 02/12/2012 undisclosed Caffeinated Mind 2010 Media sharing 
03/08/2012  undisclosed Gazehawk 2009 Data & Analytics 
04/09/2012 09/06/2012 $1 billionᵃ Instagram 2010 Media sharing 
04/13/2012 04/13/2012 undisclosed Malbec Labs, Inc/Tagtile 2011 
E-
commerce 
04/23/2012 06/14/2012 $550 millionᵃ 
AOL Patents via 
Microsoft 
 Platform 
05/08/2012  undisclosed Glancee 2010 Location services 
05/15/2012 05/15/2012 undisclosed Lightbox.com 2010 
Media 
sharing 
05/18/2012  $80 millionᵈ Karma 2011 
E-
commerce 
05/24/2012 05/24/2012 undisclosed Bolt | Peters 2002 Data & Analytics 
06/12/2012  undisclosed Peiceable 2010 Developer Tools 
06/18/2012  $100 millionᵇ Face.com 2005 
Developer 
Tools 
07/14/2012  undisclosed Spool / Blueprint Labs 2010 
media 
sharing 
07/20/2012 07/20/2012 undisclosed Acrylic Software 2008 Design 
08/24/2012  undisclosed Threadsy 2008 Data & Analytics 
03/01/2013 04/26/2013 $50-$100 millionᵈ 
Atlas Advertiser 
Suite 2001 Advertising 
03/08/2013  undisclosed Mixtent/Storylane 2010 Social Networking 
03/14/2013  undisclosed Hot Studio 1997 Design 
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04/11/2013  undisclosed Osmeta 2011 Developer Tools 
04/23/2013  undisclosed Spaceport.io 2007 
Developer 
Tools 
04/25/2013 05/23/2013 $85 millionᵇᶜ Parse 2011 
Developer 
Tools 
07/18/2013  undisclosed Monoidics 2009 Developer Tools 




2001 Artificial Intelligence 
08/23/2013  undisclosed Midnox | Luma 2011 Media sharing 
10/14/2013  $200 millionᵇ Onavo 2010 
Data & 
Analytics 
12/17/2013  undisclosed Sportstream 2012 Social Networking  
01/08/2014  $15 millionᵇ Little Eye Labs 2012 
Developer 
Tools 
01/13/2014  $15 millionᵇ Branch Media 2011 Messaging 
02/19/2014 10/03/2014 $19 billionᵃ WhatsApp 2009 Messaging 
03/25/2014  $3 billionᵈ Oculus 2012 Virtual Reality 
03/28/2014  $20 millionᶜ Ascenta 2010 Hardware 
04/24/2014  undisclosed ProtoGeo Oy | Moves 2012 
Data & 
Analytics 
06/03/2014  undisclosed Pryte 2010 Platform 
06/24/2014  undisclosed Carbon Design Group 1993 Hardware 
07/02/2014 08/14/2014 $500 millionᵇᶜ LiveRail 2007 Advertising 
07/07/2014  undisclosed RakNet 2001 Developer Tools 
08/08/2014  undisclosed PrivateCore 2011 Platform 
12/14/2014  undisclosed Nimble VR 2012 Virtual Reality 
12/16/2014  undisclosed 13th Lab 2010 Virtual Reality 
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01/06/2015  undisclosed Wit.ai 2013 
Developer 
Tools 
01/08/2015  undisclosed QuickFire Networks 2012 
Media 
Sharing 
03/13/2015  undisclosed The Find 2004 E-commerce 
05/19/2015  undisclosed TugBoat Yards 2012 E-commerce 
05/26/2015  undisclosed Surreal Vision 2014 Virtual Reality 





10/03/2015  undisclosed Engada 2014 Emerging markets 
03/09/2016  $150 millionᵈ Masquerade 2015 
Media 
Sharing 
05/23/2016  undisclosed Two Big Ears 2013 Virtual Reality 
08/08/2016  undisclosed Eyegroove 2013 Media Sharing 
09/19/2016 09/20/2016 undisclosed Nascent Objects Inc 2014 Hardware 
10/13/2016  undisclosed InfiniLED 2010 Hardware 
11/11/2016  undisclosed Crowd Tangle 2012 Data & Analytics 
11/11/2016  undisclosed Zurich Eye 2015 Hardware 
11/16/2016  undisclosed Faciometrics 2015 Media Sharing 
12/29/2016  undisclosed The Eye Tribe 2011 Virtual Reality 
07/24/2017  undisclosed Source3 Inc 2014 Platform 
07/31/2017  undisclosed Ozlo 2013 Artificial Intelligence 
08/11/2017  undisclosed Fayteq AG 2011 Media Sharing 
10/16/2017  $100 millionᵈ 




01/23/2018  undisclosed confirm.io 2015 Platform 
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07/02/2018  $30 millionᵇ Bloomsbury AI 2015 
Artificial 
Intelligence 
07/26/2018  $100 millionᵇ Redkix 2014 Platform 
08/13/2018  undisclosed Vidpresso 2012 Media Sharing 
02/04/2019  undisclosed Chain Space 2018 Digital Currency 
02/08/2019   undisclosed Grokstyle 2016 Artificial Intelligence 
ᵃ Terms reported by transacting parties. 
ᵇ Terms reported in Thomson Reuters M&A Database. 
ᶜ Terms reported in Crunchbase Pro. 
ᵈ Terms reported by media coverage of the transaction. Contact Authors for citations. 
 
 
